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INFREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
Edward T. Swaine* 
ABSTRACT 
If appellate advocates could hear from courts about topics 
that might be raised during oral argument—as opposed to 
relying solely on their ability to anticipate the issues—
might their answers be better? That seems likely, but it is 
unlikely that research could confirm that, as judicial 
practice overwhelmingly favors impromptu questioning. 
Spontaneity may be harmless if the question was 
predictable, or unavoidable if a judge just thought of the 
question. But sometimes advocates have to answer 
challenging questions concerning the law, facts, or 
implications of a position—questions that help decide the 
case, either due to the quality of the answer or the 
question’s effect on other judges—and all would be better 
served by advance notice to advocates that specific issues 
might come up during oral argument. 
This article doggedly pursues this simple but important 
proposition. It explores contemporary conditions that 
increase the value of preliminary questions, the empirics of 
their present (and limited) use, and the most compelling 
circumstances for employing them, illustrated primarily 
through missed opportunities in recent Supreme Court 
cases. Preliminary questions interrogate the traditional 
view of argument—itself fairly recent, and persisting 
despite erosion of its preconditions. But the potential for 
preliminary questions to improve judicial communication 
*Professor, George Washington University Law School. This article benefited from
personal experience in briefing and arguing cases on appeal, but much more from input 
from current practitioners. Maxwell Weiss provided superb research assistance; save for a 
few obvious exceptions, research was completed as of February 2016, when the article was 
submitted for publication. 
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and deliberation is too compelling to leave muted. The 
article concludes with a mooting of the proposal.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The three wise monkeys—pictured avoiding evil by 
covering their eyes, ears, and mouths—show the plasticity of 
symbols. Once the monkeys might really have symbolized 
rectitude or probity. (Imperfectly, of course, since they shut out 
virtue along with evil.) Nowadays, they symbolize foolish 
obliviousness, like ostriches burying their heads in the sand.
1
 
Our courts are a little like the three wise monkeys. 
Courthouse statues are the obvious comparison; perhaps because 
Lady Justice’s self-restraint is more modest—only her eyes are 
blindfolded, not her mouth or ears—she still connotes 
impartiality more than its caricature.
2
 The comparison gets a bit 
more pronounced in the Supreme Court and the federal courts of 
appeals. Proceedings begin with a blinkered view of the world, 
mostly confined to the record below, and conclude with the 
delphic pronouncement of opinions. Even the hubbub of oral 
argument—coincidentally presided over by three or more 
judges—is somewhat misleading. Judges often (but not always) 
 
1. See A.W. Smith, On the Ambiguity of the Three Wise Monkeys, 104 FOLKLORE 144, 
146–48 (1993) (tracing three-monkey symbol across cultures); see also Wolfgang Mieder, 
The Proverbial Three Wise Monkeys: Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil, in 
TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN FOLK LITERATURE 157, 173 (1987) (attributing negative 
spin to later-appearing versions of a Japanese proverb and noting frequent use of the 
monkeys “in political cartoons to express this notion . . . [of] ‘to bury one’s head in the 
sand’”). To be sure, one should also avoid unfairness toward ostriches, who are more 
responsible than oblivious: They may look as if they are hiding their heads, but they are in 
fact tending their nests. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. OSTRICH ASS’N (2015–
2016), https://www.ostriches.org/about-ostrich/faqs (scroll down to About the Ostrich, then 
click Why Do Ostriches Bury Their Head in the Sand?) (noting that sitting ostriches drop 
their heads when predators approach, letting the rock-like appearance of their bodies 
camouflage their nests). 
2. James Earle Fraser’s sculptures Authority of Law and Contemplation of Justice, 
which flank the steps of the Supreme Court Building, hedge even more: Both pieces look 
out at the world, with the latter holding a blindfolded statue of Justice in her right hand. See 
also Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, About the Court, The 
Supreme Court Building, Figures of Justice, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. (May 22, 2003), https: 
//www.supremecourt.gov/about/figuresofjustice.pdf (providing close-up photo showing 
blindfold detail and text, and explaining that blindfold may initially have been incorporated 
into depictions of justice “to indicate the tolerance of, or ignorance to, abuse of the law by 
the judicial system,” but that it is now “generally accepted as a symbol of impartiality”). 
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interact with counsel,
3
 but this is often thought to disguise a 
conversation among themselves. Some courts even ban cameras 
because it prevents both counsel and judges from speaking to 
(and performing for) the public at large.
4
 If these norms limit 
what judges see, hear, and say, it raises the question of whether 
judges, like the wise monkeys, can appreciate what’s being 
missed. 
This article attacks one such norm, that confining oral 
argument to questions unveiled by the court at argument and 
addressed impromptu by counsel.
5
 That practice makes for 
better theater, or hazing, but deserves reconsideration. The 
Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals should speak 
more often, and could then listen more constructively, by 
 
3. Up until last spring, Justice Thomas had been quiet for nearly a decade. See Adam 
Liptak, Thomas Ends 10-Year Silence on the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2016, at A1 
(pointing out that “[i]t has been at least 45 years since any other member of the court went 
even a single term without asking a question”); Adam Liptak, A Thomas Milestone Likely 
to Pass Quietly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2016, at A20 (same); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 102–05. Although his silence was harshly criticized by some, see, 
e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas’s Disgraceful Silence, NEW YORKER DAILY CMT. 
(Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/clarence-thomass-
disgraceful-silence (characterizing the Thomas silence as having gone “from curious to 
bizarre to downright embarrassing, for himself and for the institution he represents”), it 
bears a resemblance to the Court’s original practice. See infra Part II.  
4. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Bucking a Trend, Supreme Court Justices Reject Video 
Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A15 (surveying practice in other countries’ 
courts, and noting Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns about “the effect that cameras would 
have on lawyers and, perhaps more important, on the justices, who may have less self-
control than their counterparts abroad”); Nancy S. Marder, The Conundrum of Cameras in 
the Courtroom, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1489, 1514–15 (2012) (observing that “Supreme Court 
justices worry about how cameras might affect their exchange with lawyers during oral 
argument,” and noting Justice Kennedy’s belief that “the absence of cameras . . . keeps the 
public and legal community appropriately focused on the Supreme Court’s written 
opinions”). The Ninth Circuit has been more open to experiment, see generally, e.g., 
Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Some Reflections on Cameras in the Appellate Courtroom, 9 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROC. 323 (2007), and started offering public access in selected cases, Bill 
Mears, Appeals Court Hearings Now Going Live and Online, CNN (Dec. 3, 2013, 4:37 
p.m. ET), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/08/politics/appeals-court-live-online/ (noting that 
the Ninth Circuit’s first webcast would mark “the first time a federal appeals court . . . 
use[d] its equipment to offer live streams to the public”). 
5. Other aspects of the appellate process may raise related issues of silencing. For 
example, until relatively recently parties might be prohibited by local rules from citing 
unpublished opinions, even as these opinions resolved more and more cases. Now parties 
can cite them, but courts retain discretion as to their release and their effect (and, 
ultimately, the effect of citing them). See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.  
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judiciously informing parties in advance about particular issues 
the court might raise at oral argument. 
While this idea is simple, such preliminary questions are 
quite unusual, particularly in the Supreme Court, and their 
potential virtues and the appropriate occasions for their use, 
have not been assessed. The time is ripe. There is a resurgent 
academic interest in oral argument, along with other aspects of 
judicial administration,
6
 but analysis is often descriptive or veers 
toward the despairing or utopian—accepting the slow demise of 
oral argument or yearning for a return to days of yore.
7
 Given 
the potential (but unfulfilled) centrality of oral argument to 
judicial decisionmaking, more modest, pragmatic, and 
incremental change deserves consideration. 
Part II provides a brief background on the evolution of oral 
argument. Part III describes the role preliminary questions might 
serve, including their present use and contemporary examples of 
when they might have been consequential. Part IV subjects the 
proposal to its own mooting. Part V concludes. A quick word on 
 
6. Oral argument itself is the subject of a newly substantial literature. E.g., RYAN A. 
MALPHURS, RHETORIC AND DISCOURSE IN SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS: 
SENSEMAKING IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS (2103); MATTHEW M.C. ROBERTS, ORAL 
ARGUMENT AND AMICUS CURIAE (2012); RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, & 
JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE (2012); see also Richard J. Lazarus, 
Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by 
Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008) [hereinafter Lazarus, Advocacy Matters]. 
Other work explores closely related matters, such as the improvement of judicial opinions 
and the allocation of scarce judicial resources. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The 
(Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540 (2014) [hereinafter 
Lazarus, (Non)Finality]; Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A 
Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401 (2013); Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal 
Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 
(2011) [hereinafter Levy, Mechanics]; Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1109 (2011); Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment 
Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965 (2009). 
7. Sometimes all at once. In an article that emerged as this article was being submitted, 
Professors Sullivan and Canty contrast two periods of oral argument in the Supreme Court 
and find substantial differences. Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of 
a Purpose: Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12, 
50 UTAH L. REV. 1005 (2015). They recommend, among other things, that the Court 
consider returning more uninterrupted time to counsel, id. at 1020, but they also ask a 
series of uninterrupted questions about whether oral argument as it is presently practiced is 
worth it, id. at 1016–18, 1077. While sympathetic to their description, this article focuses 
on a particular technique that might help redeem the exercise. 
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scope: The focus is on federal appellate practice, particularly in 
the Supreme Court, where the problem is clearest and a cure 
most easily implemented, but similar initiatives in state and 
other courts—which are already more innovative8—would also 
be welcome. 
II.  THE EVOLVING NATURE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
Once upon a time, oral argument in the United States was a 
counsel-driven exercise. Over time, judges seized the reins, and 
now preside over a bar of extraordinarily talented advocates—
including via practices that make advocacy more difficult and 
less useful. 
A. The Supreme Court 
American courts initially followed England in eschewing 
written submissions, making oral argument the mainstay of their 
decisionmaking.
9
 In the Supreme Court, legends like William 
Pinckney, William Wirt, and Daniel Webster could talk for 
 
8. See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Tentative Oral Opinions: Improving Oral Argument Without 
Spending a Dime, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 159 (2013). Thus, at least one division of 
California’s state appellate court has sent out “focus letters,” which describe key issues 
agreed by the panel members. Id. at 164, 181; see also J. Clifford Wallace, Improving the 
Appellate Process Worldwide Through Maximizing Judicial Resources, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 187, 201 (2005) (suggesting that “judges may also instruct the parties to 
come prepared to focus on a particularly troublesome part of the appeal or, perhaps, 
binding legal authority overlooked in their briefs”). Administrative proceedings have 
occasionally explored similar techniques. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp., Delco 
Moraine Div. (N. Plant), 1992 WL 373464 at *10 (EPA 1992) (also reported at 4 E.A.D. 
334) (noting that parties in a comparable case had been directed to brief certain issues and 
to “be prepared to discuss [those issues] at oral argument,” and directing Delco Moraine 
parties to brief same issues). 
9. See generally ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE 
UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1990); see also, e.g., id. at 108 (noting that 
“[i]nitially, the arguments made by counsel to American appellate courts were exclusively 
oral because of the English heritage of the American legal system and the relative difficulty 
of having materials printed” but also pointing out that oral argument was eventually limited 
to “true advocacy” as caseloads increased—which resulted in less time for oral argument—
and legal printing became more accessible); R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written 
Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482, 483–
84 (1994) (recognizing that “early appellate practice in this country was ‘an essentially oral 
medium,’” and that “[t]he practice of written legal argument . . . is in fact a nineteenth 
century American innovation in the common law ” (citation omitted)). 
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days,
10
 but lawyers could also swap in and out like segments of 
the Pony Express.
11
 Such performances were both marvelous 
and intolerable. As the Court’s caseload increased, lengthy 
arguments prolonged its term,
12
 but little could be done about it; 
arguments were indispensable for a judiciary without staff or 
library.
13
 This also meant that advocates, whether good or bad, 
had the Court at their mercy,
14
 and Justices sat inert during 
proceedings over which they lacked meaningful control.
15
 (They 
 
10. The burdens of lengthy argument may have hastened the deaths of some Supreme 
Court advocates. See CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS IN 
SUPREME COURT HISTORY 125 (2011) (referring to Augustus Garland, stricken by 
apoplexy and dying in the Court); G. EDWARD WHITE, III–IV HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–
35 at 213–14 (1988) (describing Courtroom collapse from stroke and subsequent death of 
Thomas Emmet); id. at 254 (noting supposed role of overexertion in death of William 
Pinckney and quoting a contemporary who pointed out that Pinckney “had an influenza for 
some days, and having last week exerted himself in Court to very high degree . . . probably 
accelerated a disease to which he was constitutionally inclined”). 
11. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), the Court permitted six lawyers to 
argue. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 238. That number is not unimaginable in the modern 
era—seven different advocates participated in the Obamacare argument, see Tr. of Oral 
Arg., Fla. v. Dept. of HHS, 2012 WL 1031485, at  1 (Mar. 28, 2012) (No. 11-400); Tr. of 
Oral Arg., Nat’l Federation of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 2012 WL 1031484, at 1–2 (Mar. 28, 
2012) (Nos.11-393 & 11-400); Tr. of Oral Arg., Dept. HHS v. Fla., 2012 WL 1017220, at 1 
(Mar. 27, 2012) (No. 11-398); Tr. of Oral Arg., Dept. HHS v. Fla., 2012 WL 993811,  at 1 
(Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-398)—but the effects of unleashing multiple attorneys with 
extended time were much graver.  An extreme example, from late in this golden age, was 
the argument in Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127 (1844), in which Webster and his 
peers lasted for ten days. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY 1836–1918, at 124–33 (1928) (collecting contemporary accounts of the 
argument). For accounts of early practice by leading advocates of the present day, see 
DAVID C. FREDERICK, SUPREME COURT AND APPELLATE ADVOCACY 35–49 (2d ed. 
2010); Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court: The Felt Necessities of 
the Time, 1985 SUP. CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y YEARBOOK 22.  
12. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 25 (noting that “the tradition of unlimited argument 
placed a growing strain on the justices” and “the length of the Supreme Court’s term rose 
from 43 days in 1825 to 99 days by 1845”). 
13. G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 1, 35 (1984). 
    14. One contemporary reported that “[i]t mattered not by whom the Court was 
addressed,” since any of the age’s luminaries “received the same and no greater attention 
than any second or third rate lawyer arguing his first case.” WARREN, supra note 11, at 
470–71 (quoting observer).   
15. Chief Justice Marshall is supposed to have said that “the acme of judicial 
distinction” was “the ability to look a lawyer straight in the eye for two hours and not hear 
a damned word he says,” and Justice Story to have found arguments “excessively prolix 
and tedious.” Shapiro, supra note 11, at 25 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 26 (noting 
one lawyer’s estimation that judicial attention to arguments actually declined after the Civil 
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snuck away in shifts to take lunch, but stayed within earshot of 
counsel, who kept talking, sometimes over the audible clatter of 
forks and knives from behind the curtain.
16
) The Court’s 
passivity even gave one Golden Age advocate the perceived 
license to approach the bench, mid-argument, and take a pinch 
out of a startled Justice’s snuff-box.17 
As the judiciary’s stature, and workload, increased, it 
encouraged briefing and clamped down on the monologues. The 
Supreme Court, like some state courts, had long required some 
kind of written submission; changes adopted in the 1830s 
actually encouraged parties to submit cases on the pleadings, 
which suggested that oral argument was not sacrosanct.
18
 Other 
reforms followed. During the nineteenth century, the Court 
adopted rules that limited each side to four hours of argument, 
and after that two hours; by the early twentieth century this had 
dropped to an hour, and the Court created a summary docket that 
capped less challenging cases at thirty minutes per side; since 
1970, that has been the default across the board.
19
 With 
occasional exceptions,
20
 today’s counsel get only the time 
 
War, with a fair amount of napping involved, “[p]articularly during the lunch hour”); 
CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 24–25 (quoting early media accounts). 
16. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 123–24, 281 n.123. 
17. Id. at 22–23. The advocate was Henry Clay, who appears to have known the Justice, 
Bushrod Washington. Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, Bushrod Washington, in 1 
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789–1969, THEIR LIVES AND 
MAJOR OPINIONS at 247, 250 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds. 1969) (indicating that 
Clay had while a law student trained in Washington’s law office); see also WARREN, supra 
note 11, at 470 n.1 (“‘Sir,’ said Mr. Justice Story, in relating the circumstances to a friend, 
‘I do not believe there is a man in the United States who could have done that, but Mr. 
Clay’”). 
18. Cozine, supra note 9, at 486–88. Supreme Court Rule 44, as adopted in 1837, 
assured counsel that cases submitted based on writings would “stand on the same footing 
as if there were an appearance by counsel.” Id. at 487–88, 488 n.30 (citing rule and its 
adoption). 
19. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 124–27; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 24–27. 
20. The Court may spontaneously grant a party a few extra minutes if circumstances 
warrant. More exceptionally, it sometimes allocates additional time in advance to 
combined or particularly complex arguments. See, e.g., Order Pertaining to the Allocation 
of Oral Arg. Time, Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
Feb. 21, 2012, Nos. 11-393, 11-398, & 11-400 (allocating six hours of argument time 
among counsel for parties and amici). 
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allotted the easiest cases of a hundred years ago—about the time 
that it took Daniel Webster to clear his throat.
21
 
More written submissions, and less air time, naturally 
affected oral argument’s character. Counsel spent less time 
educating courts on the basics, and a better-prepared bench 
asked that counsel accommodate questions too.
22
 Reports of 
Justices interrupting argument increased after the Civil War.
23
 
By the mid-twentieth century, modern argument had more or 
less arrived, and it was not universally acclaimed. Argument 
before Chief Justice Hughes (rumored to have cut off one 
attorney in the middle of “if”), Justice Frankfurter (credited with 
squeezing ninety-three questions into one case), and their 
contemporaries was criticized as being closer “to the quiz 
programs on television than to the magnificent speeches” of 
yesteryear.
24
 
This evolution was hardly limited to the Supreme Court, 
but two of its features deserve special mention. The first is how 
questions are put to, and by, the Court. As oral argument was cut 
to one hour per side, the docket shifted to certiorari jurisdiction, 
giving the Court tremendous discretion as to which cases and 
issues it entertained.
25
 While the certiorari process enhanced the 
role of the parties in framing the issues for possible review,
26
 it 
 
21. Modern observers have said that “‘[t]he modern practitioner bears the same 
relationship to Daniel Webster as an airline pilot bears to Ponce de Leon.’” Seth P. 
Waxman, In the Shadow of Daniel Webster: Arguing Appeals in the Twenty-First Century, 
3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 521, 526 (2001) (quoting Steven D. Merryday, Oral Argument, 
in FLA. APP. PRAC. HANDBOOK §17.9, at 16–17 (1998)). 
22. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 124 (drawing connection between Justices’ familiarity 
with cases through review of briefs and penchant for aggressive questioning). 
23. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 26; but see id. (noting that oral argument in Ex parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), spanned twelve hours over four days, apparently 
without a peep from the Court). The theatrics and flights of oratory generally continued, 
however, with the bar being dominated by U.S. Senators—at least one of whom drew 
praise despite (or perhaps because of) his eloquence when arguing while drunk. CUSHMAN, 
supra note 10, at 121–22.  
24. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 27 (quoting an advocate cited in JOHN P. FRANK, 
MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 102 (1958)). 
25. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 26 (noting jurisdictional revisions in the Judiciary 
Act of 1925, and reduction in argument time via changes to the Supreme Court’s rules that 
same year); see also Jonathan Sternberg, Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 
1925 and the Discretionary Court, 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1 (2008) (describing beginnings of 
Court’s discretionary jurisdiction). 
26. See generally R. S. Ct. U.S. 14(1)(a) (directing that questions be expressed 
“concisely” and “without unnecessary detail” and providing that “[t]he statement of any 
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simultaneously provided peeks into the issues in which the 
Court was interested: ordinarily, those proposed by a successful 
petitioner, but sometimes issues that the Court culled from the 
petition or decided to reframe for itself.
27
 
A second noteworthy feature of the Supreme Court is, once 
again, its bar. In the popular account, the Court’s early 
indulgence of oral argument was encouraged by the 
preternaturally gifted lawyers of the day,
28
 though others stress 
the small size and uneven quality of that era’s bar,29 and 
complaints about quality did eventually become commonplace.
30
 
Today, at any rate, elite Supreme Court specialists ensure that 
many cases are briefed and argued to the highest professional 
standards.
31
 Their proficiency has enabled the Justices to adopt a 
demanding, even dizzying, style of inquiry that puts non-
specialists at a definite disadvantage.
32
 Even for regulars, the 
 
question presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included 
therein,” but also noting that “[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included 
therein, will be considered by the Court”); EUGENE GRESSMAN, KENNETH S. GELLER, 
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP & EDWARD A. HARTNETT, SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE 452–64 (10th ed. 2013). 
27. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (noting that “[a] 
litigant seeking review in this Court of a claim properly raised in the lower courts thus 
generally possesses the ability to frame the question to be decided in any way he chooses, 
without being limited to the manner in which the question was framed below,” and 
emphasizing that “[t]he petitioner can generally frame the question as broadly or as 
narrowly as he sees fit”); see also id. at 535–36 (explaining that this allows the respondent 
notice of the grounds on which the case is to be argued and sharpens discussion). As the 
Yee Court recognized, there are exceptions to this principle, such as the Court’s capacity to 
rephrase petitioner’s questions and, exceptionally, to consider questions not presented. Id.; 
see also text accompanying note 52, infra.  
28. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 11, at 28 (referring to “high quality and 
specialization” of Supreme Court bar in “the days of Marshall and Taney”). 
29. To some, this is what made courts in the United States prone to diverge from the 
English oral tradition. See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal 
Process, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1159, 1179–80 (2004) (noting, additionally, the greater 
distances faced by lawyers practicing in the colonies and suggesting that those distances 
might also have played a role the ascendancy of briefing). 
30. FREDERICK, supra note 11, at 3, 39 (citing complaints). 
31. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-Emergence of a Supreme Court 
Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 78–79 (2005); see also Tom Goldstein, The Expansion of the 
“Supreme Court Bar”, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/0 
3/the-expansion-of-the-supreme-court-bar/. 
32. Serious inequities between the parties may result. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra 
note 6, at 1554, 1557 (citing an “advocacy advantage” that goes to clients who can pay for 
experienced Supreme Court counsel, but concluding that “to some extent, market forces, 
the significant professional prestige closely associated with Supreme Court advocacy, and 
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limits may be glimpsed—counsel can find it difficult to respond 
to torrential questioning
33—and Justices, too, have complained 
about the difficulty in getting questions in edgewise.
34
 Justice 
Thomas, among others, has suggested that advocates are left 
with ever-dwindling scraps of time in which to present their own 
arguments;
35
 although his long stretches of silence have drawn 
criticism,
36
 they have the virtue of preventing a graver shortage 
of airtime. 
B. The Federal Courts of Appeals 
Trends in the federal courts of appeals are similar but more 
daunting. The length of time allowed counsel at argument now 
averages fifteen minutes or less.
37
 Even that number is largely 
hypothetical: By 2013, not even twenty percent of the cases 
resolved on the merits by the federal courts of appeals received 
 
the personal commitment of some attorneys to provide able representation to under-
represented interests” may help close the gap). 
33. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Justices Are Talking More, WASHINGTONPOST.COM 
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR20 
11030104697.html (quoting one experienced advocate to the effect that, as to questions, “it 
would be hard to ask too many more”). 
34. See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT: A C-SPAN BOOK FEATURING THE JUSTICES IN 
THEIR OWN WORDS 138 (Brian Lamb, Susan Swain & Mark Farkas eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter THEIR OWN WORDS] (quoting Justice Alito: “[I]t’s a lot harder to get in a 
question on a bench of nine than it is on a bench of three. . . . [I]f you wait until the end of 
the sentence, you will never get a question in. You have to interrupt to make your voice 
heard.”); Adam Liptak, A Most Inquisitive Court? No Argument There, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2013, at A14  (reviewing assessments by several members of the Court to the effect that 
“things had gotten out of hand in their courtroom, with their barrage of questions 
sometimes leaving the lawyers arguing before them as bystanders in their own cases”); 
Tony Mauro, Alito Reflects on His Role on the High Court, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 9, 2007 
(quoting Justice Alito as stating that “it’s extremely difficult to get a question in,” and 
reporting the need to find “a strategic opportunity to get a word in edgewise”). 
35. E.g., THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 71, 75 (quoting Justice Thomas: “I 
don’t find [oral argument] as useful now, because I think there are far too many questions.” 
. . . “I don’t see how you can learn a whole lot when there are fifty questions in an hour.”); 
Bryan A. Garner, Justice Clarence Thomas, 13 SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 99, 103–05 
(2010) (expanding on Justice Thomas’s reasons for not interrupting advocates at oral 
argument). 
    36.  See note 3, supra. 
37. David R. Cleveland & Stephen Wisotsky, The Decline of Oral Argument in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
119, 120 (2013). 
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any oral argument at all.
38
 Unlike in the Supreme Court—which 
could accommodate longer arguments by hearing (still) fewer 
cases, or putting additional argument days on its calendar—the 
federal courts of appeals have capacity constraints that are 
beyond their control.
39
 
Other contrasts are worth noting. As with the Supreme 
Court, appellate litigators—often individuals handling both 
Supreme Court cases and lower-court matters—are highly 
experienced and exceptionally talented. Their impact, though, is 
diluted across higher-volume, geographically diverse circuits; 
the uncertain availability of oral arguments also puts greater 
emphasis on briefing.
40
 And because the federal courts of 
appeals exercise appellate, rather than certiorari, jurisdiction, 
advocates suffer a relative handicap in preparing for argument. 
Appellants may pursue any properly preserved error, and 
appellees have latitude in defending the judgment, so many 
more issues are potentially up for discussion. 
Briefing crystallizes the issues on appeal and reduces the 
potential range of discussion at argument—and, by the same 
token, some differences between the Supreme Court and lower 
 
38. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2013 Annual Report of the Director: 
Judicial Business of the United States, Table B-1, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/ 
b-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2013/12/31 (showing 37,517 terminations on the 
merits in the federal courts of appeals, only 6867 of them after oral hearing, which amounts 
to 18.3 percent); see Oral Argument Task Force Report at 2–3, AM. ACAD. APP. LAWYERS 
(Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.appellateacademy.org/publications/oa_final_report_10_15_15 
.pdf (noting methodological issues associated with tracking statistics over time, but 
concluding that “oral argument has become the exception”); see generally Cleveland & 
Wisotsky, supra note 37. There remains variation among the courts. The Second Circuit, 
for example, was formerly known for hearing argument in virtually all cases, but adopted a 
non-argument calendar intended for immigration cases and other matters (such as those 
involving pro se litigants). See 2d Cir. R. 34.2 (describing non-argument calendar); see also 
2d Cir. R. 33.1 (describing exception from Civil Appeals Management Plan for cases 
placed on non-argument calendar). 
39. See, e.g., Roger J. Miner, “Dealing with the Appellate Caseload Crisis”: The 
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee Revisited, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517 
(2012/2013) (discussing longstanding concerns about “congestion, delay, expense, and 
expansion” in federal courts of appeals). 
40. See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 117 (1994) (noting that, since “the federal courts have reduced 
oral argument dramatically . . . judges have necessarily afforded greater emphasis and 
importance to the written presentation to the court”); but see, e.g., Thomas G. Hungar & 
Nikesh Jindal, Some Observations on the Rise of the Appellate Litigator, 29 REV. LITIG. 
511, 533–36 (2010) (emphasizing both briefwriting and oral argument skills for those in 
general appellate practice). 
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courts—but the playing field between bench and bar remains far 
from level. In assessing whether oral argument is unnecessary, 
an assigned panel has to consider whether the appeal is 
frivolous, whether the issues have been authoritatively settled or 
whether the briefs and record are adequate.
41
 Initial screenings 
by staff, evaluating these questions, often identify challenging 
factual or procedural issues that favor argument, at least in those 
cases ultimately heard.
42
 The result is that the panel convening 
to hear a case often has—and might relay—a decent 
understanding of why oral argument is being held, and what has 
yet to be resolved, but this remains guesswork for the parties. 
In sum, the federal courts of appeals hear a smaller 
proportion of cases, for less time, with greater variation among 
advocates, and with fewer conspicuous warnings as to what is 
on the judges’ minds; far from reversing course, suggested 
reforms typically focus on how to conserve further the time for 
argument.
43
 Sometimes the Supreme Court has seemed at risk of 
following suit. Shortly after her appointment, Justice O’Connor 
tried to persuade her colleagues that the Supreme Court follow 
its lower-court brethren in bypassing argument in some cases.
44
 
 
41. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Because the rule anticipates that oral argument might be 
unnecessary if “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and 
record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument,” id., 
it implies that better briefing diminishes the likelihood of oral argument—but some judges 
view inferior briefing and legal representation as reason to conclude that oral argument 
would serve little purpose. Stephen L. Wasby, As Seen From Behind the Bench: Judges’ 
Commentary on Lawyers’ Competence, 38 J. LEGAL PROF. 47, 64–65 (2013) (discussing 
judges’ assessments of briefs and reasons for holding or dispensing with oral argument). 
42. LAUREL HOOPER, DEAN MILBACH & ANGELIA LEVY, CASE MANAGEMENT 
PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 16–18 (2d ed. 2011) (describing case 
screening, and concluding that “[c]ase characteristics that are likely to favor oral argument 
include presence of counsel, novel issues, complex issues, extensive records, and numerous 
parties”); see also Edith H. Jones, A Snapshot of a Fifth Circuit Judge’s Work: Boutique 
Justice, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 529, 535–36 (2002) (discussing differences in appellate 
judge’s time and attention required to decide cases screened into “Light,” “Medium” and 
“Heavy” categories). Depending on the particular court’s practices, and whether the case 
was initially proposed for summary disposition, the panel may have received a written 
memorandum from a staff attorney or questioned the staff attorney, and the judges on the 
panel might even have exchanged views among themselves. See Levy, Mechanics, supra 
note 6, at 344–54.  
43. For discussion and criticism of this tendency, see BAKER, supra note 40, at 108–17; 
see also Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have 
Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (1995). 
44. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 225 (indicating that Justice Powell was wary of the 
change and that Justice Brennan was strongly opposed). 
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It seems unlikely that the present Court—with accomplished 
Supreme Court advocates in its ranks, including Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Ginsburg, and Kagan—would 
encourage that substantial a retreat,
45
 but it raises the question 
whether there would be any point to resisting. 
C. The Value of Oral Argument 
The erosion of oral argument may be read as a verdict on 
its value, so a word on that score is appropriate.
46
 At least two 
views of its potential seem admissible. On a naive view, oral 
argument allows advocates the chance to persuade judges and 
address their concerns, and thus betters decisions and opinions. 
Judges have said that argument sometimes changes how they 
resolve cases.
47
 On a more sophisticated view, argument is 
 
45. But see FREDERICK, supra note 11, at 2 (cautioning that if “that trend [of reducing 
the time allotted for oral argument] continues, by later in the twenty-first century, the 
Supreme Court may eliminate oral argument altogether except in the most important cases, 
thereby following the trend of courts of appeals that are deciding an ever-larger percentage 
of cases solely on the basis of written submissions”). 
46. See generally, e.g., MALPHURS, supra note 6, at 18 (noting widespread scholarly 
concern about whether oral arguments matter and describing that concern as “the driving 
question surrounding most academic research on the [Supreme] Court”). 
47. A number of current Justices have suggested as much. E.g., MARCIA COYLE, THE 
ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 169–70 (2013) (quoting 
statements by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy about the importance of oral 
argument in the decisionmaking process); THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 21–22 
(quoting Chief Justice Roberts, stating that he changes his mind “[a]ll the time” while 
listening to argument, and that you “go into argument with not a totally blank slate . . . . but 
you’ve got all these questions”); id. at 113 (reporting Justice Breyer’s estimate that he 
changes his mind about which side should prevail after argument in only five to ten percent 
of cases, but that he “think[s] differently about a case” about one-third of the time); id. at 
139–40 (quoting Justice Alito, stating that he “certainly” changes his mind after oral 
argument, though less frequently about the “bottom line,” and that oral argument “tends to 
crystallize things” for him). Justice Thomas, in contrast, has expressed doubt about the 
influence of oral argument. See, e.g., THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 71, 75; Garner, 
supra note 35, at 104 (noting Justice Thomas’s conviction that the questioning at oral 
argument is “just too much”). Among former members of the Court, Justice Scalia reported 
that it is “probably quite rare, although not unheard of, that oral argument will change [his] 
mind,” THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 42, and that “very often you come in on the 
knife’s edge, quite undecided,” and “oral argument can turn the corner,” Antonin Scalia, A 
Voice for the Write, A.B.A. J., May 2008, at 36, 38. Justices Brennan and White, in 
contrast, often spoke to the significance of oral argument, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
see Shapiro, supra note 11, at 29–30 (quoting remarks), the last estimating that it had, in 
between twenty-five and fifty percent of the cases argued, affected his views somewhat.  
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predominantly a means for judges to lobby each other, using 
counsel as though they were ventriloquist dummies.
48
 Because 
argument may be the last (and perhaps the first) real opportunity 
for judges to interact on a case before voting—Supreme Court 
Justices typically confer later that same week,
49
 and lower court 
panels may even vote later that same day
50—it is a critical 
opportunity to learn what others think and to persuade them.
51
 
 
Countless other judges have opined about the question, but non-impressionistic data 
are harder to find. Two Eighth Circuit judges reported that, according to notes taken during 
oral argument, it changed their views in between seventeen and thirty-seven percent of 
cases. Myron H. Bright & Richard S. Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial! 70 
A.B.A. J. 68 (Sept. 1984) (displaying data in table). In another study, one of those judges 
reported results ranging from thirteen to twenty-one percent. Myron H. Bright, The Power 
of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 IOWA L. REV. 35, 39–40 (1986); see 
also Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Oral Advocacy 
Before the United States Supreme Court: Does it Affect the Justice’s Decisions? 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 457 (2007) (suggesting, based on review of notes taken during oral argument by 
Justice Blackmun, that the quality of oral advocacy may influence outcomes). 
48. Former Solicitor General Drew Days described occasions on which Justices “are 
talking to a fellow justice through you,” but allowed that there are also “some questions 
that are real questions” in that “Justices want to know the answer to the question, 
something that’s been [preying] on their minds.” THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 
249. 
    49.   COYLE, supra note 47, at 169 (referring to “closed door conference” held “after 
each week’s arguments”); see also THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 71 (quoting 
Justice Thomas: “[T]he cases that we hear on Mondays . . . are decided on Wednesday 
afternoons. The cases that are argued on Tuesday and Wednesday are decided on Friday 
morning.”). 
    50.  See, e.g., Bright & Arnold, supra note 47, at 68–69 (indicating that Eighth Circuit 
judges vote soon after daily arguments are complete).  
51. Chief Justice Roberts has explained that the Justices “come to [oral argument] cold 
as far as knowing what everybody thinks. So through the questioning we’re learning for the 
first time what other justices’ views are of the case. And that can alter how you view it, 
right on the spot.” THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 18–19. Justice Douglas reported, 
less enthusiastically, that he “soon learned that . . . questioning from the bench was . . . a 
form of lobbying for votes.” PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT 
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 72 (1995); see also FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A 
JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 110 (1980) (stating that 
“[o]ften when a judge addresses questions to an advocate, he is really communicating with 
his brethren, and that “[i]n a sense, therefore, the conference of the judges begins during 
argument”); COYLE, supra note 47, at 169 (claiming that “[t]he justices learn for the first 
time what their colleagues are thinking about a case during oral arguments in that case,” 
stressing the limited interactions among Justices beforehand, and noting the formal 
announcement of individual Justices’ views at conference held within a week of oral 
argument); Panel Discussion: The Women at the United States Supreme Court, 42 SW. L. 
REV. 503, 522 (2013) (reporting that Justice Powell, when asked about the value of oral 
argument, replied that “It’s the first time that I get to hear what my colleagues are 
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Neither view, unfortunately, resolves whether oral 
argument should be maintained or changed. Either way, 
argument is consequential, albeit for different reasons, and it 
undoubtedly matters in subtler ways as well—disciplining 
written submissions by forcing counsel to anticipate the 
possibility of being chewed out, promoting judicial engagement, 
and so forth. Equally important, the payoffs plausibly depend on 
how courts actually conduct argument, which has changed 
dramatically over time. Even if one doubts, for example, that 
arguments today change the outcome of many decisions, that 
says little definitive about their potential impact. Refining how 
judges pose questions might improve the payoff on either the 
naive or sophisticated views. If not, certainly, the entire exercise 
needs reconsideration. 
III.  QUESTIONS SELDOM POSED 
While modern oral argument often looks like a free-for-all, 
courts can vary and discipline how they tender questions. The 
easiest technique—sending counsel questions that might be 
posed in the actual argument, to facilitate their preparation—is 
rarely employed, despite the abundance of opportunities. 
A. Other Ways to Ask Questions 
Although counsel establish, at least initially, the roster of 
potential questions before the Supreme Court, the Court 
sometimes shows its hand. When granting certiorari, it 
sometimes asks the parties to brief and argue an additional 
question. Such intervention, even if otherwise unwelcome, gives 
counsel maximum notice, allowing them to adjust both their 
written and oral presentations. (It also resolves a distinct kind of 
problem for the Court—anticipating a potential dilemma it 
might otherwise face between ducking an issue or deciding a 
question never properly put before it—and remains reserved for 
important and substantially distinct questions of law.
 52
) 
 
thinking,” which reflected Justice O’Connor’s observation that some Justices use the 
opportunity to ask questions that will “educate their colleagues”).  
52. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 535–36. It goes further, of course, if the Court adds a question 
not resolved below. See, e.g., United States v. Tex., 2016 WL 207257 (2016) (No. 15-674) 
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On other, equally rare occasions, the Court, having 
uncovered an issue not adequately addressed by the principal 
briefs, has asked that the parties file supplemental briefs—
usually on threshold jurisdictional questions.
53
 If the request 
comes prior to oral argument, it suggests a possible topic for live 
discussion, but the primary or even exclusive emphasis is on 
briefing.
54
 
Apart from these unusual requests, the Court’s practice is to 
hold fire until oral argument. Once in a while, the Court asks 
counsel to be prepared to discuss matters not set for 
 
(granting certiorari and adding question relating to President’s Take Care authority). The 
practice of adding to the parties’ questions was more common when the Court exercised 
other forms of appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Julian Messner, Inc. v. Spahn, 393 U.S. 818 
(1968) (noting probable jurisdiction and requesting counsel to “discuss in their briefs and 
oral arguments, in addition to the other questions present,” the question of whether 
injunctive relief granted below was unconstitutional prior restraint), appeal dismissed, 393 
U.S. 1046 (1969); cf. Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
1227 (1979) (discussing evolution of Supreme Court’s jurisdiction). 
    53. But cf., e.g., Order, Zubik v. Burwell, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court 
orders/032916zr_3d9g.pdf (U.S. Mar. 29, 2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 
15-105, 15-119, & 15-191) (post-argument order directing the filing of supplemental briefs 
on the topic of “whether and how contraceptive coverage may be obtained by petitioners’ 
employees through petitioners’ insurance companies, but in a way that does not require any 
involvement of petitioners beyond their own decision to provide health insurance without 
contraceptive coverage to their employees,” and adding additional background and 
exemplary situations that might be addressed). 
54. Ten days before argument in a qui tam case, the Supreme Court issued a request for 
supplemental briefs on Article III standing, with the briefs to be due the day after 
argument. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 528 U.S. 1015 
(1999) (mem.) (“Parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following 
question: ‘Does a private person have standing under Article III to litigate claims of fraud 
upon the government?’”). When petitioner’s counsel began oral argument with that issue, 
Tr. of Oral Arg., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 1999 WL 
1134650, at 3 (Nov. 29, 1999) (No. 98-1828) (indicating that counsel’s substantive opening 
was “This Court has asked us, of course, to brief and argue an additional issue”), a Justice 
advised him that he was “perfectly free” to do so, but that it was not required, as “[w]e 
asked you to brief the additional issue. . . . [w]e didn’t ask you to argue it,” id. A 
substantial portion of the Stevens argument was devoted to standing, propelled by questions 
from the Court, to the point that counsel was eventually advised by a questioner that “you 
only have half an hour to argue,” id. at 15, but ultimately the Court did not resolve the case 
on that ground. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787–88 (holding that “a private individual has standing 
to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act . . . 
but that the . . . Act does not subject a State (or state agency) to liability in such actions”); 
but see Docket Entry, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (Feb. 28, 2003) (advising counsel 
that they “should be prepared to discuss the jurisdiction of this Court and of the Court of 
Appeals in this case, see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949),” 
but also advising them to file and serve supplemental briefs on the question).  
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supplemental briefing. The circumstances tend, unsurprisingly, 
to the unusual and compelling. For example, in early October 
2015, the Court appointed counsel to represent the petitioner in a 
case to be argued at the beginning of November. A few days 
before argument, it asked counsel to be prepared to discuss 
which court a writ of certiorari should be directed toward, and 
that topic indeed consumed a fair amount of time at the 
argument.
55
 Revealingly, the Court’s notice was unusual enough 
that it attracted media attention.
56
 
The federal courts of appeals, likewise, have used 
preliminary questions only sporadically, making the surprise of 
a pre-argument inquiry rival any averted surprise at oral 
argument. Jurisdictional issues, or at least a fraction of them, are 
favorites,
57
 but as described more fully below, courts sometimes 
raise others.
58
 Recently, for example, the D.C. Circuit issued a 
per curiam order “that the Government be prepared to discuss at 
oral argument whether the evidence on which the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States and the President of the 
 
55. Foster v. Chatman, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 290 (Oct. 5, 2015) (mem.) (appointing 
counsel for petitioner); Docket Entry, Foster v. Chatman, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737 
(Oct. 30, 2015) (advising counsel, via letter from Clerk of Court, to be “prepared to discuss 
at oral argument whether certiorari in this case should be directed to the Supreme Court of 
Georgia or the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, and what significance, if any, that 
determination may have on the Court’s resolution of the case”); Tr. of Oral Arg., Foster v. 
Chatman,  ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737, at 3 (Nov. 2, 2015) (No. 14-8349) (directing 
counsel to “address first the . . . question we raised on Friday”); see also Docket Entry, 
Commonwealth of P.R. v. Valle ___ U.S. ___,  136 S. Ct. 1863 (Jan. 8, 2016) (advising 
counsel, via letter from Clerk of Court, to “be prepared to discuss at oral argument whether 
this Court has jurisdiction to review the ruling of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico”); 
Docket Entry, Alvarez v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 576 (Oct. 2, 2009) (advising 
counsel, via letter from Clerk of Court, to “be prepared to discuss at oral argument whether 
respondents have had forfeiture hearings or otherwise had their property returned, and, if 
they have, the potential significance of those facts with respect to questions of mootness”). 
56. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Advocates Must Switch Gears for Last-Minute Issue Raised 
by Justices, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Nov. 4, 2015, at A4; Tony Mauro, Justices’ 
Eleventh-Hour Queries Scramble Oral Arguments, LAW.COM (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www 
.law.com/sites/articles/2015/11/16/justices-eleventh-hour-queries-scramble-oral-arguments. 
57. See, e.g., Pet. for Writ of Cert., ProtectMarriage.com—Yes on 8 v. Bowen, ___ U.S. 
___, 135 S. Ct. 1523 (Oct. 10, 2014) at 5–6 (recounting order by Ninth Circuit that parties 
be prepared to discuss mootness of campaign-finance-disclosure question in light of rule 
that “once a fact is widely available to the public, a court cannot grant any ‘effective relief’ 
to a person seeking to keep that fact a secret” (quoting Doe v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1240 
(9th Cir. 2012)).  
    58.  See text accompanying notes 70–71, infra. 
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United States relied in issuing their mitigation orders is 
classified, unclassified or both.”59 
Occasionally, the lower courts have attempted to routinize 
this practice. Panels of the Fifth Circuit used to instruct counsel 
to be ready to discuss certain topics via a courtly letter 
explaining that the notice was designed to promote reflection, 
did not reveal the interest or predisposition of the court as a 
whole, and was simply part of what the court might wish to 
discuss with counsel.
60
 In 1995, the Third Circuit amended its 
local rule concerning oral argument to provide that “[i]n certain 
 
59. Per Curiam Order of Apr. 30, 2014, Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the 
United States, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320 n.19 (relying on 
government’s reply at oral argument and indicating that desired preparation for oral 
argument was conveyed to counsel in “an order before oral argument requesting that the 
Government be prepared to discuss the nature of the evidence reviewed by CFIUS and the 
President,” and that “[r]esponding to . . . [the court’s] inquiry at oral argument, the 
Appellees’ counsel stated that CFIUS and the President relied on both classified and 
unclassified evidence”). That particular question could only be directed to one side, but 
ordinarily, preliminary questions may be efficiently and reliably posed to both parties—a 
substantial advantage over live questioning at oral argument. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg., 
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, 2009 WL 3229082, at 46–47 (Dec. 8, 2009) (No. 08-604) (posing question to 
respondent’s counsel and noting that “the same question is really addressed to your fellow 
counsel”); id. at 55–59 (indicating that question was not posed anew to petitioner’s counsel 
on rebuttal). 
60. See BAKER, supra note 40, at 112 n.20 (noting experiments by federal courts of 
appeals, “most notably the Fifth Circuit,” with “the judges on the hearing panel providing 
counsel with written questions before oral argument”). The late Judge Alvin Rubin of the 
Fifth Circuit would sometimes draft letters along the following lines, which the clerk’s 
office would then send to counsel on behalf of the court as a whole: 
After reviewing the briefs in this matter, the court had a few questions that at 
least one of the judges who will hear your argument knows in advance he would 
like to have answered or commented on in oral argument. Knowing that 
interruption of counsel to put these questions may interfere with counsel’s train 
of thought, and desiring also to give counsel at least some opportunity to reflect 
on the questions, we are submitting them to you. We suggest that you try to 
answer them as directly as possible during the course of your argument. 
Of course, the fact that the court desires to know your answers to these questions 
must not be taken as an indication of the direction of the court’s thoughts or of 
the issues that the court considers decisive. Instead, they are part of the court’s 
effort to understand the case as completely as possible. 
You will likely be asked to answer other questions from members of the court as 
your argument proceeds. These, too, are designed merely to enable the court to 
understand your position. We hope that you will welcome the opportunity to 
give us as much information as possible. 
The questions that we know at this time are the following . . . . 
Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the 
Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 31 n.182 (1986) (quoting Rubin letter). 
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appeals, the clerk will inform the parties by letter of a particular 
issue(s) that the panel wishes the parties to address.”61 The rule 
might have memorialized a practice, rather than changing one, 
since (by one crude measure) the number of inquiries dropped 
following adoption.
62
 The number of such questions, while 
fluctuating wildly, has never been substantial, amounting to an 
average of about six inquiries per year over a twenty-five year 
period and dropping to less than two per year over the last ten 
years
63—this in a court that still resolves well over 200 cases per 
year after oral argument.
64
 The only other court to formalize its 
practice, the D.C. Circuit,
65
 averaged below one inquiry per 
 
61. 3D CIR. LOCAL APP. R. 34.1(c); cf. 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P.—2015 at 
2.4.2 (noting that “judges usually vote for oral argument when . . . [a] judge has questions 
to ask counsel to clarify an important legal, factual, or procedural point”). 28 U.S.C. appx. 
62.  To get a sense of this volume, I used the Bloomberg electronic database to survey 
PACER docket information from 1990 to February 2016. The Third Circuit clerk’s office 
does not ordinarily invoke Local Rule 34.1(c) in issuing preliminary questions, but it is 
possible to search Bloomberg for key phrases (particularly a proximity search for “discuss” 
and “oral argument”) in order to identify potential inquiries of the kind considered here. 
For sake of potential comparability, the same method was applied to review the other 
federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.  
The substantial limits of this survey—for purposes of reference, the Docket Survey, 
on file with author—deserve emphasis. It unavoidably misses some inquiries, due to 
varying phrasing and deficiencies in the docket entries, while turning up others of a 
materially different nature, such as denials of dispositive motions (the questions posed by 
the parties being slated for argument instead) or orders derived from the parties’ requests 
for oral argument. Plainly duplicative inquiries—for example, asking the parties in cases 
posing similar issues a question concerning the effect of a recent decision—were excluded 
as necessary to avoid double-counting identical questions to related parties in appeals with 
different docket numbers. This approach had a disproportionate effect in the D.C. Circuit, 
which one year posed the same question (concerning the potential impact of pending 
telecommunications legislation) in seven docketed appeals scheduled for argument in one 
brief span. Id.  
For related reasons, comparisons among the courts are certainly problematic. For 
example, some courts more readily included the text of actual opinions in the database. In 
the case of the Ninth and Federal Circuits, the Bloomberg search also produced thousands 
of false positives due to the framing of attorney-appearance and argument-related orders in 
those courts; because manual review of the dockets would have been required to eliminate 
all of these false positives, no conclusions were drawn about either court. Judges with 
particular predilections for pre-argument questions also appeared to have an outsized 
influence on their courts’ totals (even, potentially, elsewhere, if they sit by designation). 
63. Id. 
64. Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary—Table B-1, U.S. CTS. (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2015/06/30  
(showing 229 terminations on the merits after oral argument in the Third Circuit). 
65. HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES, UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 49–50 (Internal Operating P. XI(C)(1),  
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year, with three-fifths issued in a mid-1990s burst—about the 
same overall total as the Sixth Circuit,
66
 which had no stated 
practice at all. In sum, inquiries by ten other circuits combined 
were but two-thirds of the Third Circuit’s total, with many 
circuits racing the Supreme Court to the bottom.
67
 
B. Questions That Deserve Asking 
While small as a fraction of arguments, preliminary 
questioning in the federal courts of appeals to date illustrates 
when it may be useful. The most obvious subjects of inquiry 
involve jurisdictional and other threshold issues like standing or 
mootness.
68
 Such questions are especially strong candidates for 
advance notice, insofar as they are fundamental and 
nondiscretionary in character; perhaps because they are such an 
obvious candidate for inquiry, however, advance warning may 
not be as necessary.
69
 In any event, lower courts have also found 
it fruitful to raise non-threshold legal issues, likely on the 
supposition that these too may dominate oral argument and 
deserve the fullest possible preparation.
70
 Thus, for example, 
 
discussing responsibilities of screening judge and providing that “argument may be limited 
to certain issues” and that “counsel may be advised that the panel wishes additional 
questions to be addressed at oral argument”). 
    66.  Docket Survey, supra note 62. 
67. Id. (indicating 102 inquiries in ten circuits, as compared to 148 in Third Circuit 
alone); see also text accompanying note 55, supra (noting handful of jurisdictional 
inquiries in the Supreme Court). But the reader should bear in mind, again, the substantial 
limitations of the data and the exclusion of the Ninth and Federal circuits. See note 62, 
supra.  
68. See supra text accompanying notes 54–55. 
69. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) 
(discussing significance of briefing and argument of jurisdictional questions); id. at 122 
n.15 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., concurring) (same). 
70. In the Third Circuit, these appeared to outnumber more threshold questions: Less 
than one-quarter of the legal issues highlighted for counsel concerned what was manifestly 
a jurisdictional or other threshold question. (That said, the nature of many inquiries was at 
least somewhat obscure—either because an underlying letter to counsel was only partly 
summarized, or because the inquiry referred to cases without disclosing the nature of the 
issue to which the cases referred.) See Docket Survey, supra note 62. Matters were 
different in the D.C. Circuit, where the overwhelming majority of legal issues posed to 
parties concerned threshold matters. Id. One might suppose that in any court, when a 
potential jurisdictional question was spotted, it was much more likely to be posed to 
counsel before argument; in any case, it is likely that the number of non-threshold 
questions uncovered by the Docket Survey is just the tip of the iceberg. 
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they have on numerous occasions called on counsel to prepare to 
discuss particular cases, statutes, or other legal materials not 
adequately addressed in the briefs, either because they are new 
or just overlooked.
71
 
The Supreme Court’s practice has been a little different, 
and in part reflects its different circumstances. The number of 
potential issues has tapered off by the time a case reaches the 
Court; given the additional rounds of briefing by that point, the 
intensity of preparation, and the few decisions in which the 
Court is actively interested (other than its own), overlooked case 
law and other legal authority are also less of a concern. These 
differences, however, are far from categorical. For example, 
though raising at argument cases not mentioned in the briefs 
may be entirely within bounds, mentioning them earlier can be 
mutually beneficial if it is a prelude to further discussion,
72
 
 
71. In the Third Circuit, approximately half the inquiries flagged legal authority like 
cases or statutes, while a slightly smaller number (sixty-five, as opposed to seventy-five) 
alluded to preparing to discuss legal issues without directly adverting to particular 
authority. Docket Survey, supra note 62; but see id. (showing that fewer than one-quarter 
of D.C. Circuit inquiries related to legal authority). Queries as to whether there was any 
precedent for a particular proposition were uncommon among  the posed questions, though 
those arose often at oral argument; perhaps such questions were hard to frame in advance, 
or it seemed doubtful that any such precedent could exist, and perhaps the use of that 
question at oral argument was essentially rhetorical. For unrequited requests for a “single 
case” at oral argument, see United States v. Fisher, 624 F.3d 713, 720 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l 
Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
497 F.3d 615, 634 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Askew, 482 F.3d 532, 550–51 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (Edwards, J., dissenting), reversed, 529 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (en banc); 
Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (Sutton, J., dissenting); N.L.R.B. v. 
Omnix Int’l Corp., 1992 WL 209504 (1st Cir. 1992) at *6 (unpublished); United States v. 
Anderson, 2000 WL 770556 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2000) at *3, vacated, 55 M.J. 
198 (C.A.A.F. 2001). 
72. See Tr. of Oral Arg., Barber v. Thomas, 2010 WL 1285402, at 39–41 (Mar. 30, 
2010) (No. 09-5201) (indicating, in respondent’s counsel’s answer to a question by Justice 
Kennedy, lack of familiarity with Supreme Court rule-of-lenity precedent cited in amicus 
brief); see Barber, 560 U.S. at 500–01 (Kennedy, J., with Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994), the case mentioned at 
oral argument). In another example, then-Solicitor General Kagan was asked about a case 
that had not been cited in the briefs, and she indicated that she was not familiar with the 
case, but recovered when its core holding was described. Tr. of Oral Arg., Robertson v. 
United States, 2010 WL 1285397, at 62 (Mar. 31, 2010) (No. 08-6261) (referring to 
Bartkus v. Ill., 359 U.S. 121 (1959)); see also id. at 63–64 (showing Solicitor General’s 
forthright acknowledgement that she had “not thought about” a different question). 
It is the rare case in which counsel is unaware of a case central to resolution of a 
matter, but even momentary error may be consequential. In one argument, counsel was 
asked by Justice O’Connor whether the Supreme Court had ever “applied [Village of] 
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particularly if the case is not widely reported or obviously 
germane.
73
 
It takes only a moment’s reflection to think of other 
questions—rarely, if ever, reflected in existing inquiries—for 
which more than a moment’s reflection would be useful; at least 
some of these conjectures find support by seeing what happened 
when preliminary questions were not tendered.
74
 One broad 
category involves questions best answered after further research, 
which can make demands beyond anything answered by 
assiduous use of Westlaw and Lexis. For example, factual 
questions may warrant advance inquiry when the record is 
particularly voluminous, as may be the case following agency 
rulemaking, or when the court is interested in minutiae.
75
 
 
Arlington Heights [v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)] to a Section 5 
determination,” and then she added, “I thought we had not, but what do you rely on for 
that?” Tr. of Oral Arg., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 1996 WL 718469, at 9 (Dec. 9, 
1996) (Nos. 95-1455 & 95-1508). Counsel responded that he relied on Rogers v. Lodge, 
458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); in rebuttal, he apologized for not “answer[ing] very well” and 
stated that the Supreme Court had “reflected its respect” for the standard’s application in 
other cases cited in his brief. Id. at 9, 54. The brief actually indicated that only two 
Supreme Court cases other than Rogers, a plurality opinion, had done so, although the 
Court had affirmed similar lower court judgments. Brief for Federal Appellant at 17–19, 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 1999 WL 133834 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1996) (Nos. 95-1455 & 
95-1508). Justice O’Connor’s question was not difficult to forecast, and only the fortuity of 
rebuttal time—which would not have been available to a respondent—allowed counsel to 
address it again. But by then, the Court was less interested in examining the precise 
character of the authority, and the opportunity for respondent to challenge the later 
depiction had been lost. 
73. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg., Hibbs v. Winn, 2004 WL 193039, at 3–9 (Jan. 20, 2004) 
(No. 02-1809) (questioning counsel as to meaning of “assessment” under Tax Injunction 
Act, in light of case argued the preceding week, United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114 
(2004), of which counsel was evidently unaware); Terry Goddard, Expect the Unexpected, 
ARIZ. ATT’Y, April 2006, at 31 (explaining that “[i]n an instant, the good Justice upended 
my weeks of preparation and sent me scrambling,” given that “I had no clue in what 
context the case she referred to had used the term,” and that “I managed to hide most of my 
astonishment, but at the time I felt like a prizefighter who had just been knocked over the 
ropes”); cf. FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY: TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 72 
(2013) (noting, in argument of Landmark Commc’ns v. Va., 435 U.S. 829 (1978), “a 
question from Justice Rehnquist for which I was totally unprepared” concerning the First 
Amendment rights of corporations, relating to a different but contemporary case, which the 
Justice proceeded to suggest might be equivalent to those of individuals in press matters). 
74. As is evident below, this is easiest to substantiate in the Supreme Court, for which 
transcripts of oral argument are reliably available; for the federal courts of appeals, some 
evidence may also be divined from accounts of oral argument in published opinions. 
75. In a number of opinions, the federal courts of appeals have complained about the 
inability of counsel to point to relevant portions of the record, though it is rarely clear 
whether the record would ever have resolved the questions at hand. See, e.g., United States 
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Sometimes judges ask about obscure or peripheral matters that 
may not even be part of the formal record,
76
 or raise subjects 
that test the depth of a typical lawyer’s (or judge’s) expertise—
 
v. Parker, 716 F.3d 999, 1012 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the court “asked government 
counsel at oral argument to identify the judge’s statement that most clearly indicates a 
finding of willful falsity,” but that “[c]ounsel could not point to any such statement”); 
Everitt v. Pneumo Abex, L.L.C., 411 F. App’x 726, 729–30 (5th Cir. 2011) (pointing out 
that “[w]hen questioned directly at oral argument, Pneumo’s counsel never denied the fact 
of that cooperation, and was unable to pinpoint any date in this record before the 
bankruptcy court’s January 2006 determination that the parties’ cooperative paths 
diverged”); Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting 
out verbatim an exchange between court and counsel at oral argument, and concluding that 
the court “simply cannot find anything in the record that suggests that either the parties or 
the district court appreciate the difference between personal and official capacity § 1983 
lawsuits”); United Ins. Co. v. Unisys Corp., 68 F. App’x 269, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that “[a]t oral argument, we pressed counsel for Unisys to show where the protection was 
acquired, but counsel could not cite any record evidence of such a purchase”); King v. Va. 
Emp’t Comm’n, 33 F.3d 51 (tbl.), 1994 WL 416439, at *6 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[D]espite 
repeated questions from the bench during oral argument as to where any such evidence 
might be found in the record, plaintiff’s counsel could not locate any, and the court’s 
review of the record discloses none”). 
By way of contrast, in the Third Circuit, counsel have been constructively asked in 
advance to address the facts and circumstances relating to a party’s prior conviction. 
Clerk’s Letter to Counsel (May 7, 2002), United States v. Rosario-Moya, No. 01-3977 (36 
Fed. App’x 506 (3d Cir. 2002)); see 36 Fed. App’x at 506 (thanking counsel for ordering 
transcript and indicating that oral argument had been “particularly helpful for us in 
ferreting out the facts relating to the 1986 conviction”). It was also successful in eliciting 
the precise location of a party’s manufacturing facility, the driveway leading into it, and the 
adjacent public right of way. Clerk’s Letter to Counsel (Mar. 1, 2002), Snyder’s of 
Hanover v. NLRB, No. 010-3201 (39 Fed. App’x 730 (3d Cr. 2002)); see 39 Fed. App’x at 
734–35 & n.2 (relying on location details).  
76. In Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, lawyers were vague about when the 
defendant/counter-claimant first had cause to understand that diversity was incomplete, as 
well as in regards to case law regarding collateral attacks and the chronology relating to 
refiling. Tr. of Oral Arg.,  Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 2004 WL 526928 at 3–5, 
18–19, 23, 30 (Mar. 3, 2004) (No. 02-1689). Neither counsel seemed prepared to discuss a 
related question on the choice of law as to limitations and savings provisions, which bore 
on the practical consequences of permitting post-filing changes, id. at 22–24, 30–31, 
although these proved relevant to the dissent. 541 U.S. at 595 n.11 (Ginsburg, Stevens, 
Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). See also ABRAMS, supra note 73, at 68–69 (noting 
ruefully a question concerning the record in a First Amendment case that he was able to 
answer, but which he had not anticipated, and its potential consequences for his argument 
even as answered (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg., Landmark Commc’ns Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S. 829 
(Jan. 11, 1978) (No. 76-1450)). For a near miss, see William J. Schafer III, Not So 
Cert-ain, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2006, at 22 (describing how, a week before argument, counsel 
had—purely by happenstance—called every county attorney in Arizona to see if a statute 
had ever been employed, only to be asked that precise question at argument). Mr. Schafer’s 
case was Cassius v. Arizona, 420 U.S. 514 (1975) (dismissing writ as improvidently 
granted). 
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such as technology
77
 or math.
78
 A court may also pick a needle 
from the amici haystack, requiring instant expertise with matters 
at a remove from those in the principal briefs.
79
 
A second broad category involves issues that require 
reflection as much as research. The archetypal question is the 
hypothetical, and at the Supreme Court, the leading practitioner 
is Justice Breyer, who specializes in posing professorial, head-
scratching scenarios. While their last-minute unveiling adds 
drama, and offers a greater test of counsel, hypotheticals need 
not necessarily be sprung like pop quizzes, and there is reason to 
rethink their delivery. Even if the hypotheticals’ particulars 
(about aspirin fingers, anti-raccoon patents, tomato children 
threatening Boston, and pet oysters in parks) are only 
 
77. See, e.g., Joe Silver, Supreme Court Struggles With E-mail But Will Shape 
Technology’s Future, Ars Technica, May 6, 2014 (noting acknowledgment by Justice 
Kagan that the Supreme Court as a whole has not adopted e-mail, and citing examples of 
confusion in technology cases); e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg., City of Ontario v. Quon, 2010 WL 
1540005 at 29, 43–44 (Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 08-1332) (showing, inter alia, questions 
concerning “the difference between the pager and the e-mail,” and “[w]hat happens . . . if 
. . .  he is on the pager and sending a message and they are trying to reach him for . . . a 
SWAT team crisis? Does . . . the one kind of trump the other, or do they get a busy 
signal?”). Judges uncertain about their expertise, and even embarrassed about it, might 
particularly welcome the opportunity to pose clarifying questions anonymously via the 
clerk’s office; counsel would probably benefit in any event from the opportunity to confirm 
the answers. See id. at 50, 52 (showing that counsel at first indicated that text messages 
could be deleted from pagers, but then reflecting counsel’s uncertainty concerning whether 
text messages to pagers could be wholly deleted).  
78. See, e.g., Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 234 F.3d 36, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(complaining that “FERC counsel could not even assure this court that the Commission’s 
arithmetic in calculating the adjusted hypothetical cost of service was correct”). 
79. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2107 at 38–40, 47, 48 (Apr. 15, 2013) (No. 12-398) (showing 
extensive questioning from Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Alito based on 
amicus brief filed in case on patent-eligible subject matter by scientist involved in Human 
Genome Project); Tr. of Oral Arg., Grutter v. Bollinger,  539 U.S. 306 at 19 (Apr. 1, 2003) 
(No. 02-241) (showing question from Justice Stevens soliciting counsel’s “view of the 
strength” of argument in amicus brief by former high-ranking officers and top civilian 
leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines); BARBARA A. PERRY, THE MICHIGAN 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 114 (2007) (characterizing counsel as being “momentarily 
thrown,” and noting significance of amicus brief’s “taking center stage at the Court”); see 
also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (relying on amicus brief alone in raising the 
retroactivity of one of petitioner’s claims, pointing out that “[t]he question of retroactivity 
with regard to petitioner’s fair cross section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief,” 
but noting that the “question is not foreign to the parties,” and characterizing the Court’s 
“sua sponte consideration of retroactivity” as “far from novel” (citations omitted)). 
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temporarily baffling,
80
 they probably reward more careful 
consideration, at least if they might decide a case or change an 
opinion.
81
 Hypotheticals asked at the beginning of argument 
(which are less likely to be spontaneous reactions to the 
proceedings)
82
 or posed to more than one advocate (which seem 
 
80. Mark Sherman, Breyer, Court Master of the “What If?” WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2008 
(mentioning raccoons that destroy door-opening sensors, tomatoes grown as hosts for 
human genetic material, and pet oysters); see Tr. of Oral Arg., Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 2011 WL 6077582 at 12–18, (Dec. 7, 2011) (No. 10-1150) 
(hypothesizing potentially patentable invention consisting of mere observation that a 
person’s little finger indicates whether aspirin is needed, and ultimately sparing counsel 
“15 fancy hypotheticals”); Tr. of Oral Arg., KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 WL 
3422210 at 35–36 (Nov. 28, 2006) (No. 04-1350) (imagining “I have a sensor on my 
garage door at the lower hinge for when the car is coming in and out, and the raccoons are 
eating it,” then suggesting “the brainstorm of putting it on the upper hinge” and that it 
would be “naive” to expect placement of sensor on upper hinge to be patentable); Tr. of 
Oral Arg., Gonzalez v. Raich, 2004 WL 2845980 at 30 (Nov. 29, 2004) (No. 03-1454) 
(stating, in response to counsel’s articulation of proposition that Congress might be able to 
regulate purely intrastate conduct like marijuana cultivation if it was essential to a “larger 
regulatory scheme”: “You know, he grows heroin, cocaine, tomatoes that are going to have 
genomes in them that could, at some point, lead to tomato children that will eventually 
affect Boston”); Tr. of Oral Arg., FCC v. Nextwave Personal Commc’n, 2002 WL 
31309185 at 28 (Oct. 8, 2002) (Nos. 01–653, 01–657) (stating that “[n]o animals in the 
park doesn’t necessarily apply to a pet oyster,” prompting discussion of whether an oyster 
was an animal); see also Nextwave, 537 U.S. 293, 311 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(adopting more traditional example of an ordinance proscribing all vehicles in a park, 
which would nonetheless not apply “to baby strollers or even to tanks used as part of a war 
memorial”); see also Tr. of Oral Arg., Loughrin v. United States, 2014 WL 1293242 at 22–
27, 31–35 (Apr. 1, 2014) (No. 13-316) (unfurling bank-fraud hypothetical and variants 
thereupon involving Crook, Smith, and—fleetingly—Jones). Justice Breyer was joined by 
colleagues in discussing a poisoned potato given to a racehorse, vinegar poured into a 
goldfish bowl (citing a question posed by Justice Alito in the previous oral argument in the 
case that suggested vinegar was poisonous to goldfish, Tr. of Oral Arg., Bond v. United 
States, 2011 WL 601690 at 29 (Feb. 22, 2011) (No. 09-1227)), and chocolate candy bars as 
containing a chemical poisonous to dogs, all in a case involving violations of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which eventually provoked the Solicitor 
General to remind the Court that the case was a serious matter. Tr. of Oral Arg., Bond v. 
United States, 2013 WL 6908184 at 35–38 (Nov. 5, 2013) (No. 12-158). 
81. Sometimes they actually feature in the ensuing opinions. See, e.g., Seal v. Morgan, 
229 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding, after discussing counsel’s conflicting 
responses to a hypothetical posed at oral argument, that a board of education’s position was 
irreconcilable with the rational pursuit of a legitimate state interest); United States v. 
Ramirez-Ferrer, 1995 WL 237041, *12–*13 (1st Cir. Apr. 27, 1995) (quoting colloquy 
from oral argument, and citing the failure of counsel for the government to satisfactorily 
distinguish between a hypothetical and the case at hand, as critical to the court’s conclusion 
that a statutory interpretation would lead to absurd results), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 82 F.3d 1131 (1st Cir. 1996). 
82. In one recent case, for example, the first question—from Justice Kagan—was a 
hypothetical that appeared to confound one of the Court’s finest advocates, in part because 
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more central)
83
 are particularly appealing candidates for posing 
preliminarily, but any imagined in advance may be proffered—
and developing a practice that actually prompts them to be 
imagined in advance, and worked out in writing, might do 
wonders to reduce the confusion they can cause.
84
 
Hypotheticals simply illustrate the general point that 
foundational issues may, in a judge’s own judgment, deserve 
careful contemplation.
85
 Justice Blackmun, for example, would 
 
it might have required a different answer under the governing statute; the hypothetical was 
then reinterpreted by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, to no clearer end, though counsel did 
make progress during rebuttal. Tr. of Oral Arg., Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 
2014  WL 7661627 at 3–7, 58–59 (Oct. 8, 2014) (No. 13-433); see also Tr. of Oral Arg., 
Md. v. Shatzer, 2009 WL 3169420 at 31–37 (Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 08-680) (reflecting that 
argument began with a hypothetical from Justice Alito, one that counsel confessed later in 
the argument that she had not answered appropriately, later attracting the interest of the 
Chief Justice, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor).  
83. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg., Hill v. McDonough, 2006 WL 1194528 at 31–35, 43–44 
(Apr. 26, 2006) (No. 05-8794) (asking respondent’s counsel and counsel for amicus 
arguing in support of respondent whether defendant subject to capital sentence would be 
required, if he could show prospect that means of execution would cause excruciating pain, 
to suggest an alternative means); Tr. of Oral Arg., Stogner v. Cal., 2003 WL 1798530 at 
17–19, 27–28 (Mar. 31, 2003) (No. 01-1757) (posing hypothetical to both respondent’s 
counsel and counsel for amicus arguing in support of respondent). 
84. As Justice Breyer once allowed, “this is pretty tough, we try to construct some 
hypotheticals, and—and the counsel says, oh, I’ve got this part wrong or that part wrong or 
the other one, and they may be right. And we can’t do this, figuring out all these factual 
things in an hour, frankly.” Tr. of Oral Arg., McCutcheon v. FEC, at 41, 2013 WL 5845702 
(Oct. 8, 2013) (No. 12-536). And regarding oysters in the park, Justice Breyer said “[t]he 
result [of asking that question] was unfortunate.” Sherman, supra note 80. In particular, to 
the extent hypotheticals (and—often analog—analogies) are ventured on technological 
matters, they might benefit from refinement and articulation prior to argument—and from 
giving counsel additional time to digest their meaning and correct any mistaken 
assumptions underlying them. Selina MacLaren, The Supreme Court’s Baffling Tech 
Illiteracy is Becoming a Problem, SALON (June 28, 2014), http://www 
.salon.com/2014/06/28/the_supreme_courts_baffling_tech_illiteracy_is_becoming_a_big_ 
problem/ (“[A]nalogies were critical in [a group of recent] cases . . . In past arguments, 
computers were analogized to typewriters, phone books and calculators. Video games were 
compared to films, comic books and Grimm’s fairy tales. Text messages were analogized 
to letters to the editor. A risk-hedging method was compared to horse-training and the 
alphabet. EBay was likened to a Ferris wheel, and also to the process of introducing a 
baker to a grocer. The list goes on.”). 
85. In a case concerning gay marriage, for example, Justice Sotomayor asked: “Outside 
of . . . the marriage context, can you think of any other rational basis, reason, for a State 
using sexual orientation as a factor in denying homosexuals benefits or imposing burdens 
on them? Is there any other rational decision-making that the Government could make? 
Denying them a job, not granting them benefits of some sort, any other decision?” Counsel 
responded, before later recovering somewhat, “Your Honor, I cannot. I do not have any— 
anything to offer you in that regard.” Tr. of Oral Arg., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2013 WL 
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sometimes urge that a party reflect on its litigating position, 
including in light of considerations not apparent prior to 
argument.
86
 Promoting the use of preliminary questions might 
even liberate Justices to advance questions they might withhold 
 
6908183 at 14 (Mar. 26, 2013) (No. 12-144); see also Tr. of Oral Arg., Demore v. Kim,    
2003 WL 147701 at 62–63 (Jan. 15, 2003) (No. 01-1491) (showing that counsel answered 
Justice’s query—“one question that’s very important for me and you can answer it yes or 
no”—in the negative, with caveat that “we haven’t briefed and studied that”). 
Not every issue that later appears foundational will have occurred to counsel. For 
example, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether due process 
permitted the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on 
acts by an indirect corporate subsidiary on behalf of the defendant. At oral argument, 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan directed discussion away from agency and toward the 
point that—even if the subsidiary’s acts were entirely imputable—there would still not be 
enough for general jurisdiction over the parent. Tr. of Oral Arg., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
2013 WL 5629592 at 7–8, 22–23, 30–31, 48–52 (Oct. 15, 2014) (No. 11-965) [hereinafter 
Bauman Transcript]. Later resolving the case on that basis, the Court noted that this was 
“fairly encompasse[d]” within the question on which certiorari was granted, and that amici 
had focused on the question. Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 
n.16. Justice Sotomayor, however, observed that the court of appeals had not addressed the 
question, and that the parties had neither devoted attention to it nor been asked to brief it. 
Id. at 765–66 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). It might have improved matters 
to pose the issue before oral argument. See Bauman Transcript, supra this note, at 52 
(reporting respondent’s counsel stating that “this is an important question that hasn’t been 
briefed in this case, it wasn’t preserved below, and I think that you ought to decide the case 
on the grounds, on the premises on which it has been litigated for eight years,” and 
suggesting that “if you can’t do that you ought to dismiss the case as improvidently granted 
or at least remand the case to allow a full airing of these issues in an appropriate forum”). 
86. FREDERICK, supra note 11, at 82–83 (quoting argument in Lee v. Weisman, 
including inability of counsel to answer questions about precise ages, with estimate 
supplied by Justice Blackmun); id. at 122–24 (noting that in RAV v. St. Paul, counsel for 
St. Paul could not identify a particular cross-street, apparently near a poorly maintained 
public park); id. at 124 (noting that though latter exchange “did not contribute to the 
court’s understanding of the issues,” counsel had handled it appropriately). Sometimes 
Justice Blackmun was pursuing a larger point. In a case involving the return of Haitian 
refugees, the only questions he asked of government counsel were whether she had been to 
Haiti, and after learning she had not, whether she was familiar with Graham Greene’s The 
Comedians, which she also answered in the negative, prompting him to state simply “I 
recommend it to you.” Tr. of Oral Arg., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 1993 WL 
754941 at 25 (Mar. 2, 1993) (No. 92-344). The point, presumably, concerned the sobering 
history of political violence in Haiti—and while posing such questions before argument 
would have spoiled their dramatic impact, it might have inspired more constructive 
reflection, particularly given the uncertainty as to whether U.S. policy would be continued 
or defended as before. But see Transcript, Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the 
Solicitor General of the United States—Bush Panel, 2003 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 68 (remarks of 
Maureen Mahoney) (noting that, while one of Mahoney’s colleagues had predicted that 
Justice Blackmun would ask whether she had ever been to Haiti, “the moral of the story . . . 
is really that if you want to be really prepared for arguments in the Supreme Court, you 
have got to read a lot of fiction”). 
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at oral argument because they are too complex or distracting, or 
—if more dramatic solutions, like dismissal or reargument, 
appear belatedly to the Court to be in the offing—even help 
enlist counsel in evaluating those options.
87
 
The primary goal of pre-argument notice, obviously, is to 
help counsel prepare, particularly for inquiries that are less 
predictable or more consequential. This is a marginal, but not 
trivial, objective. Even if the best counsel are fully prepared, or 
experienced and quick-witted enough, to answer serviceably, not 
every counsel is among the bar’s elite; the best, in any case, are 
likely to answer a fully anticipated question yet more accurately 
and persuasively. (That answers could be extracted on the spot is 
no better defense of present practices than, say, the possibility of 
writing briefs overnight is a warrant for making that the 
convention, and while briefing is more important than oral 
argument, there is no reason to inflate the difference.
88
) Among 
possible reforms, moreover, preliminary questioning rivals any 
 
87. A few years ago, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question of 
corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute, and after initial argument, directed 
reargument with supplemental briefing on the issue of the statute’s extraterritoriality. See 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (restoring case 
to argument calendar and directing counsel “to file supplemental briefs addressing the 
following question: ‘Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of 
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States’”); Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (granting certiorari). 
Supplemental briefing, and not merely a pre-argument question, was probably required. 
Even so, it was clear at the first argument that several Justices arrived intent on engaging 
petitioner’s counsel (and, to a lesser degree, counsel for the United States as amicus) on 
extraterritoriality and its compatibility with international law, and advance notice would 
have generated a sounder preview of the considerations bearing on reargument—including 
by respondent’s counsel. Tr. of Oral Arg., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2012 WL 
628670 at 7–9, 11–14, 22 (Feb. 28, 2012) (No. 10-1491). Perhaps alarmingly, on 
reargument, personal jurisdiction was the first topic of conversation, notwithstanding the 
new (and different) focus of the reargument order. Tr. of Oral Arg., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 2012 WL 4486095 at 3–4, 22 (Oct. 10, 2012) (No. 10-1491). 
88. It is at least possible, the Supreme Court has shown, to require briefing over a 
weekend (as opposed to within thirty or more days), and to arrange simultaneous filing 
(rather than allowing each side to react to the other)—but it is indicated only in what the 
Court perceives to be exigent circumstances. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046–47 (2000) 
(staying action below, treating application for stay as application for writ of certiorari, 
granting writ, and establishing accelerated schedule); see Tr. of Oral Arg., Bush v. Gore 
2000 WL 1804429 at 3 (Dec. 11, 2000) (No. 00-949) [hereinafter Bush v. Gore Transcript] 
(indicating that the Chief Justice began by “commend[ing] all of the parties to this case on 
their exemplary briefing under very trying circumstances”). 
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return from giving more time to counsel—assuming that is 
realistically on the table. Counsel notified of certain issues are 
likely to be better prepared to deal appropriately with others as 
well, to the extent they adjust their agenda. Moreover, unlike 
tweaking time limits, preliminary questions enable consulting 
others not at the podium. Given a heads-up, clients may provide 
information or indicate a definitive position, which can be 
wanting at oral argument.
89
 Other lawyers can provide input—
just as with moot courts
90—and the broader public may even be 
crowd-sourced; the same counsel would be responsible for 
answering at oral argument, but without artificial self-reliance. 
Ultimately, this serves the judiciary as well. On a naive 
view of oral argument, capably addressing issues that judges 
deem relevant improves judicial decisionmaking—and avoids 
inadvertent error.
91
 The same holds even on a more sophisticated 
view, insofar as better answers to a judge’s questions are a more 
reliable means of persuading other judges. Even if one thinks 
that answers would largely be unaffected, notice may help courts 
resolve the weight to place on ensuing exchanges. For example, 
judges pursue concessions at oral argument, which often prove 
to be decisive.
92
 A core objection concerns the legitimacy of 
 
89. See, e.g., Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1155, 1155 n.6 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (objecting that “[d]uring a lengthy discussion at oral argument on this 
issue, Pylon’s counsel, when asked directly, could not offer express assurances that Pylon 
could satisfy a damages judgment and a prospective royalty payment.”); Marin-Rodriguez 
v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2010) (ordering remand after counsel for the 
government could not answer at oral argument whether the Board of Immigration Appeals 
had changed its mind concerning its jurisdiction); cf. Mot. for Leave to File Supp. Br. after 
Arg. and Supp. Br. after Arg. for Pet’rs (March 18, 2005), McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 
2005 WL 1397050 (Mar. 18, 2005) (No. 03–1693) (attempting to reinforce assertion, made 
at oral argument in response to questioning, that religious resolution adopted by county 
government was no longer effective, citing resolutions enacted by county after its officials 
witnessed the oral argument and adopted repealing resolutions); Tony Mauro, Supreme 
Court Monitor: Passing the “Lemon” Test, NAT’L L.J., June 10, 2005 (discussing post-
argument supplemental briefs filed in McCreary). 
90. For a much more ambitious vision of how this might be facilitated with draft 
opinions, see Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 6. 
91. Cf. Lazarus, (Non)Finality, supra note 6. 
92. Either in terms of a particular issue or an entire appeal. See, e.g., D.C. v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 631 (2008) (referring to a concession made at oral argument); Alaska Dep’t of 
Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 509 (2004) (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, CJ, Scalia 
& Thomas, JJ, dissenting) (“Counsel for respondents were unable to identify, either in their 
briefs or at oral argument, a single State that ‘does not have in its law the requirement that 
its own agencies . . . act rationally.’”); Fowler v. R.I., 345 U.S. 67, 67 (1953) (referring to a 
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depending on “relatively spontaneous”—perhaps browbeaten— 
“responses of counsel to equally spontaneous questioning from 
the Court during oral argument.”93 That objection loses force if 
the question has been previewed. Conversely, if a preliminary 
question is eschewed, as it may well be, there is still less reason 
to credit the reply. 
 
* * * 
 
Because oral argument, at least as it is presently practiced, 
seems to be of secondary importance in most cases, it is worth 
recalling that it is one of the few practices—like briefing, or the 
selection of judges—that potentially affects the gamut of cases, 
on all legal subjects, heard by appellate courts. This suggests the 
potential for incremental, subtle payoffs from preliminary 
questions, but more pointed illustrations may be available. 
 
concession made at oral argument); T-Mobile N.E. LLC v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 672 F.3d 259, 272 n.* (4th Cir. 2012) (Agee, J., concurring) (same); United 
Steelworkers of Am., Local No. 185 v. Herman, 216 F.3d 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(noting that counsel for the union “effectively conceded” a point during oral argument); 
Tenacre Found. v. INS, 78 F.3d 693, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that INS conceded 
“principal points” on a particular issue at oral argument); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that counsel “admitted” certain point at oral argument); Edmond 
v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing two 
concessions made at oral argument); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 286 (2003) 
(Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (noting concession at oral argument that specific policy 
was not before the Court). In one unfortunate episode, counsel conceded a proposition at 
oral argument that deprived their clients of standing, though after argument they submitted 
an (untimely) affidavit that might, at least had it first been presented to the agency, have 
warranted a contrary conclusion. Iowans for WOI-TV, Inc. v. FCC, 1995 WL 116251 at *1 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (unpublished).  
93. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 170 (1972) (stating that “[w]e are 
loath to attach conclusive weight to the relatively spontaneous responses of counsel to 
equally spontaneous questioning from the Court during oral argument,” but noting 
arguments in briefing consistent with answer at oral argument, and acknowledging 
potential tactical nature of position); compare Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 
U.S. 765, 772 (2002) (attaching significance to concession), with id. at 810 (Ginsburg, 
Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (discounting “apparent concession” as “on the 
spot answers to fast-paced hypothetical questions at oral argument” (citing Moose Lodge)); 
compare also Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 104 (2010) 
(citing “necessary” concession at oral argument), with id. at 120, 120 n.4 (Sotomayor, 
Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (disputing apparent concession and emphasizing that 
Court was not bound by concessions relating to statutory interpretation); compare also In 
re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 424 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing concession at oral argument and in letter 
to en banc court), with id. at 439 n.8 (Jones, Smith, Clement, Elrod, & Haynes, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disputing supposed waiver via oral argument). 
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Perhaps the most important case in recent history, Bush v. 
Gore,
94
 could be pressed into service as an example of a missed 
opportunity. Insider accounts, if credited, suggest that Justices 
had circulated internal memoranda on topics that might have 
been of considerable interest to counsel,
95
 and the ensuing 
argument reinforced the possible utility of advance notice;
96
 the 
circumstances were unrepresentative, but advance notice might 
have been the more appropriate course in light of the 
extraordinarily limited time for preparation. 
Another recent example was Michigan v. EPA,
97
 an 
important environmental argument in which Justice Breyer’s 
description of a legitimate means for the EPA to consider 
regulatory costs caught counsel, and the other Justices, 
unawares.
98
 After Justice Breyer suggested that the approach 
might be purely hypothetical, a characterization on which other 
Justices pounced,
99
 it was reconciled with how the agency 
 
94. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
95. David Margolick, Evgenia Peretz & Michael Shnayerson The Path to Florida, 
VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310, 355–56 (recounting how Justice O’Connor and Justice 
Kennedy had circulated memoranda before argument, with the latter forecasting a decisive 
shift from jurisdictional arguments emphasized in the briefing to equal protection 
arguments that had received much less emphasis).  
96. There was extensive discussion concerning, for example, an inquiry initiated by 
Justice Kennedy as to whether the federal question involved was different from that 
emphasized by counsel for Bush. Bush v. Gore Transcript, supra note 88, at 4–7. Later, 
Justice Kennedy asked counsel for Gore a hypothetical as to whether the Florida legislature 
might have, by statute, done what the Florida Supreme Court had attempted, to which 
counsel replied—“I think that it would be unusual. I haven’t really thought about that 
question. I think they probably could not”—without successfully defusing the issue. Id. at 
40–41; see also id. at 18 (showing counsel for Bush indicating that he did not “know the 
complete answer” to a legal entailment of a hypothetical); id. at 20 (showing counsel for 
Bush saying, “I haven’t thought about [a different hypothetical]”). 
    97.   ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
98. Tr. of Oral Arg., Mich. v. EPA, 2015 WL 1387860 at 22–26 (Mar. 25, 2015) (Nos. 
14-46, 14-47, 14-49) (showing Breyer hypothetical, counsel’s response, and other Justices’ 
reactions), 49–58 (same), 76–79 (showing Justices Scalia, Kagan, Alito, and Breyer all 
asking follow-up questions); see id. at 24–25 (showing suggestion by counsel that no one 
had made the argument in question); id. at 25 (showing statement by Justice Scalia that “I 
never heard of this argument”). 
99. Id. at 50 (showing suggestion by Justice Breyer attributing possibility to “discussion 
and thought in my chambers”). Justice Breyer added, however, that “maybe it came out of 
the briefs, too.” Id. at 51; see id. at 55 (showing question by Chief Justice Roberts to the 
Solicitor General as to “where [in the record] this argument was made or considered by the 
agency,” “[a]s opposed to Justice Breyer’s chambers,” which was not directly answered); 
id. at 58 (showing similar unanswered question from Justice Scalia).  
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actually proceeded by the close of argument.
100
 By that point, 
however, the approach’s appeal had been compromised, and it 
featured prominently only in a dissent for four Justices;
101
 prior 
disclosure might have led to its clarification and a more ringing 
endorsement—with record citations—by counsel for the EPA, 
along with any appropriate rejoinders. 
Still more recently, Justice Thomas broke his decade-long 
silence by posing “one question” (which morphed into at least 
eight more),
102
 at the close of respondent’s argument, 
concerning whether there was any other area in which a 
misdemeanor conviction could support an indefinite suspension 
of constitutional rights.
103
 Counsel was unable to think of 
examples on the spot, and the question clearly engaged others on 
the Court, with Justice Breyer expressing the view that it was a 
“major question.”104 Unfortunately, it was also a question that 
neither counsel had benefit of beforehand, and oral argument 
was probably the last opportunity for substantive discussion 
among the Justices before they gathered to vote.
105
 
Citizens United v. FEC
106
 may be the litmus test, given 
breathless accounts that “a single question changed the case, and 
perhaps American history.”107 The case involved a nonprofit 
corporation concerned about penalties for making available a 
film criticizing a presidential candidate. The corporation’s 
objection focused on whether the FEC was applying the federal 
campaign-finance statute properly, in light of constitutional 
 
100. Id. at 76–79. Justice Breyer was quick to concur that “it was not made up in my 
chambers,” to which counsel graciously replied, “Although they did a wonderful job 
figuring it out again, Your Honor.” Id. at 78. 
101. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2718–19 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., 
dissenting) (addressing EPA commitment “to account for costs ‘[a]s a part of developing a 
regulation’”). 
    102. Tr. of Oral Arg., Voisine v. U.S., 2016 WL 1028386 at 35–40 (Feb. 29, 2016) (No. 
14-10154) [hereinafter Voisine Transcript].  
    103.  Voisine v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016). 
    104.  Voisine Transcript, supra note 102, at 41. 
105. In her brief rebuttal, counsel for the opposing party simply alluded to the issue of 
indefinite abrogation, rather than more directly capitalizing on the question that was 
troubling at least some members of the Court. Id. at 43–44. 
    106.  558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
107. Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 36, 40 
(referring to hypothetical about governmental banning of books that Justice Alito posed at 
oral argument). 
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concerns,
108
 but oral argument was more freewheeling. Most 
notably, the Justices questioned government counsel as to 
whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit the use of 
corporate funds to publish books engaged in similar advocacy. 
The government’s position that Congress might be able to do 
so—perhaps not with respect to media corporations, and perhaps 
bearing medium-specific considerations in mind, among other 
things—sounded consistent with the Court’s precedent. Justice 
Alito, however, reacted as though this was “incredible,” and 
others likewise.
109
 The Court conducted reargument and held the 
statute unconstitutional, in part given concerns about the 
slippery slope toward regulating all forms of political 
advocacy.
110
 
It is impossible to show that a preliminary question would 
have changed the outcome in Citizens United, and there is room 
for doubt. The basic inquiry was not a bolt from the blue—a 
facial challenge not being wholly alien to the as-applied issues 
before the Court
111—and experienced counsel took it in stride. 
The Court’s order of re-argument on the facial question, 
moreover, allowed the government to change its answer, which 
 
108. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318–22; Tr. of Oral Arg., Citizens United v. FEC., 
2009 WL 760811 at 35–40 (Mar. 24, 2009) (No. 08-205) [hereinafter Citizens United 
March Transcript] (showing attempt by counsel to distinguish type of communication at 
issue from that which Congress intended to regulate); id. at 16–17, 23 (emphasizing 
statutory question, as construed in light of constitutional avoidance principles, before 
acceding to Justice Scalia’s emphasis on constitutional question). Compare Appellate Pet., 
Mot. & Filing at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 2008 WL 3851546 (Aug. 14, 2008) (No. 08-
205) (stating broad as-applied constitutional challenges in jurisdictional statement), with 
Br. for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 2009 WL 61467 (Jan. 8, 2009) (No. 08-205) 
(stating more circumscribed, fact-specific challenges following change in counsel). 
109. Citizens United March Transcript, supra note 108, at 26–38. 
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333 (deeming it “necessary . . . to consider the facial 
validity” of the act, because “[a]ny other course of decision would prolong the substantial, 
nationwide chilling effect caused by [the act’s] prohibitions on corporate expenditures”), 
355–56 (discussing corruption and appearance of corruption), 361–62 (discussing quid pro 
quo corruption, foreign influence on elections, and the like); see id. at 365 (overruling 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and holding that “the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity” because “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political 
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”). 
111. Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 331 (explaining that “the distinction 
between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic 
effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a 
constitutional challenge”), with id. at 398–405 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, 
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stressing significance of distinction). 
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limited any downside.
112
 Even so, this was a defective (and 
avoidable) way of inviting reflective advocacy. Book-related 
questions were hypothetical in a very strong sense, since before 
argument they looked to have been excluded from consideration; 
as Justice Stevens insisted, facial validity was “relinquished 
below, not included in the questions presented to us by the 
litigants, and argued”—after the first go-round—“only in 
response to the Court’s invitation.”113 The Justices also 
formulated their inquiries inexactly, necessitating distracting 
corrections.
114
 Finally, the fact that the government later 
reversed its position actually suggests that, had the Court posed 
the question before argument, counsel and its client might have 
deliberated and settled on a different initial answer, mollifying 
some of the Justices and changing the case’s later direction.115 
The Court’s complaints about the government’s answers—that it 
had not successfully distinguished the regulation of books,
116
 
 
112.  Tr. of Oral Arg., Citizens United v. FEC., 2009 WL 6325467 at 64 (Sept. 9, 2009) 
(No. 08-205) [hereinafter Citizens United September Transcript] (showing counsel’s 
statement, in response to question concerning constitutionality of regulating at least some 
printed materials, including books, that “[t]he government’s answer has changed”); but see 
Citizens United, at 558 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Setting the case for reargument was a 
constructive step, but it did not cure th[e] fundamental problem. Essentially, five Justices 
were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to 
give themselves an opportunity to change the law.”). 
113. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
114. See, e.g., Citizens United March Transcript, supra note 108, at 27, 29–30 (showing 
counsel’s reaction to concerns expressed by Justices Alito and Kennedy and Chief Justice 
Roberts that the FEC could ban certain publications outright, as opposed to restricting the 
use of corporate treasury funds toward that end); cf. 558 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, Ginsburg, 
Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting, after 
subsequent second argument, to the Court’s “ominous image of a ‘categorical ba[n]’ on 
corporate speech,” which “is highly misleading, and needs to be corrected”). 
115. For discussion of the Court’s dynamics following initial argument, see generally 
Toobin, supra note 107. The counterfactual is complicated, of course: Justice Kagan, 
whose first argument as Solicitor General was the re-argument of Citizens United, was 
confirmed as Solicitor General only five days before the initial argument. Whether she 
would at that point have anticipated such a question from the Court and mooted an answer, 
let alone favored a different position without first having seen the Court’s reaction to 
discussion of the issue, is simply guesswork. 
116. The Court attributed to the government the position that it was permitted to “ban 
corporate expenditures for almost all forms of communication stemming from a 
corporation,” and represented that its precedent might permit application of the act to 
“printing books,” but cited without clear effect the government’s response that it had not 
applied and probably could not constitutionally apply the existing statute to a book. 
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and that the Court was somehow obliged to consider facial 
validity because of “the uncertainty caused by the litigating 
position of the Government”117—were, at least in part, a 
complaint about the Court’s own choice as to how and when to 
pose its inquiries.
118
 
Other examples could be cited, but the basic point is the 
same. If a question deserves a considered answer, as opposed to 
the best spontaneous answer, it is better tendered beforehand. 
The commitment to oral argument, even if waning, requires 
taking seriously the resources it entails. Having established an 
expert appellate bar, in part through vigorous inquiry, courts 
should strive to extract better advice from its members—not 
treat the challenge of argument as an end in itself. 
VI. SOME PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS (AND ANSWERS) 
Courthouse statues notwithstanding, oral argument has not 
been cast in stone. The drift of innovation has been toward 
limiting its availability and duration, but the Supreme Court has 
shown some flexibility in complex cases,
119
 and some Justices 
 
Citizens United at 349. The Court’s conclusion—that “[t]his troubling assertion of 
brooding governmental power cannot be reconciled with the confidence and stability in 
civic discourse that the First Amendment must secure,” id.—is impenetrable. 
117. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333. But see id. at 402 n.7 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer 
& Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our colleagues have 
apparently never heard of an alternative argument.”). 
118. To be sure, this was accentuated by the corporate petitioner, which provoked 
clarification of its rights by filing the case in advance of any evident interest by the FEC in 
regulating its conduct. 
119. Mainly in terms of adding more time, ranging from the five and a half hours 
allocated to argument on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act to an additional 
thirty minutes per side for an important case involving EPA air pollution standards. See 
Tony Mauro, Justices Warm to EPA Air Pollution Standards, NAT’L L.J. (online edition), 
Dec. 10, 2013 (noting order in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. 
Ct. 1584 (2014) that increased argument time to ninety minutes from sixty). The Court has 
on occasion also been more flexible in letting oral argument spill over the normal 
allotments. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, High Court Justices Question Power of Bush Order in 
“Medellin” Case, NAT’L L.J. (online edition), Oct. 11, 2007 (noting that argument in 
Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. 491 (2008), ran twenty-six minutes over its limit, featured 176 
questions, and caused one Justice to ask “meekly” if counsel could be permitted to answer 
“‘without interruption by all of my colleagues’”).  
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have acknowledged the need to manage arguments differently—
if only to avoid a free-for-all.
120
 
Even so, the idea that preliminary questions could be used 
more routinely may be viewed skeptically by some judges, so it 
might be best to preview some of the likely questions, with the 
hope of provoking satisfactory answers. 
 
COURT: Counsel, we barely had time to get through the 
briefs. What makes you think we have time to think up 
questions in advance, let alone agree on which to issue? 
 
COUNSEL: Your honor, sometimes preliminary questions 
will be impracticable. Courts of appeals, though, often cull 
cases for argument, which might generate possible 
questions,
121
 and so might bench memos prepared by 
clerks.
122
 As to agreeing in advance, individual judges 
could nominate questions, subject to veto by the other 
judges hearing an argument, before the clerk’s office issues 
them. The Third Circuit, among other courts of appeals, has 
made this work, and best practices might be developed. 
The Supreme Court will do things somewhat differently, of 
course, but this should be even easier for it to manage. It 
has a smaller docket and greater capacity. Preparation by 
the Justices and their clerks before argument—even 
reaching back to certiorari—may already have generated 
questions, and could be used to create more.
123
 Any Justice 
 
120. Liptak, supra note 34 (noting recent concessions by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Ginsburg that oral argument may require greater management); see also supra notes 
35, 47 (noting Justice Thomas’s views). 
121. See text accompanying note 42, supra.  
    122.  See, e.g., Stephen Louis A. Dillard, Open Chambers Revisited: Demystifying the 
Inner Workings and Culture of the Georgia Court of Appeals, 68 MERCER L. REV. 1, 12–
14 (2016) (reporting observations by a state court of appeals judge contrasting time 
pressures on preparation for oral argument on that court with his experience as a clerk on a 
federal court of appeals, during which clerks and their judge spent extensive time preparing 
and reviewing cases prior to argument). 
123. See, e.g., Garner, supra note 35, at 123 (reporting on Justice Thomas’s explanation 
of how his decisionmaking process begins at the certiorari stage, and how he and his clerks 
already “have an outline form of the disposition of the case . . . when we go on the bench”); 
Bryan A. Garner, Justice John Paul Stevens, 13 SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 41, 47 (2010) 
(discussing review of cases with clerks before and after oral argument); Bryan A. Garner, 
Justice Antonin Scalia, 13 SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 51, 67 (2010) (noting reliance on 
discussions with law clerks); Bryan A. Garner, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 13 
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could circulate a question directly to the clerk, perhaps for 
transmission to counsel after approval by at least one other 
Justice. The Court could even hold pre-argument 
conferences, but that does not seem essential. 
Undoubtedly this takes time and effort. But respectfully, if 
the questions help with issues that are hard to resolve in the 
short time allotted for argument, investing time up front 
may save more time in the long run.  
 
COURT: Isn’t this just a way of making our jobs harder, 
and yours easier? It lets you wait to get our questions, 
rather than preparing on your own. 
 
COUNSEL: It’s unlikely that preliminary questions would 
be so frequent or comprehensive—or timely—as to obviate 
other preparation. Counsel will know that other questions 
are likely to develop during argument and will want to 
develop their own arguments. But if this is a real concern, 
the clerk could communicate any preliminary questions 
only shortly before argument. Any advance notice, 
however short, would reduce surprise, permit some 
contemplation and consultation, and make for better 
answers. 
 
COURT: Won’t questions just excite the media? We have 
issues with the media. 
 
COUNSEL: It’s true that, no matter how many caveats you 
give, questions may be pored over to see if they reveal the 
court’s disposition. Interest may wane if such questions 
become routine. Naturally, if a particular question has the 
potential to cause dramatic effect, like a huge swing in the 
stock market, it could be held back until oral argument or 
never posed at all. 
Preliminary questions will probably attract the same kind of 
attention as questions posed at argument, and to that extent, 
may moderate reaction to the argument itself. There’s one 
 
SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 5, 7 (2010) (discussing need for Justices to prepare for oral 
argument by contemplating questions and the rationale behind each, while allowing for 
spur-of-the-moment questions as well). 
SWAINEPERSONAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  5/15/2017  3:03 PM 
308 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS 
potential difference, however. While preliminary questions 
can be issued for the court as a whole, via the clerk
124
—and 
then raised at argument by counsel, the presiding judge, or 
any judge at all—questioning now is unavoidably 
associated with a particular judge, personalizing the inquiry 
and fueling speculation about that judge’s vote.
125
 The 
relative anonymity of preliminary questions might reduce 
media sensationalism and even coax reluctant questioners 
off the back bench. 
 
COURT: Some of you—some of us, even—think we ask 
too many questions as it is, to the point where counsel can’t 
answer them all. Wouldn’t this just make things worse? 
 
COUNSEL: Just as you say, your honor, self-restraint may 
be necessary. It’s not clear, though, that preliminary 
questions would hurt. Circulating good questions might 
cause other judges to belay their own. And preliminary 
questions need not be discussed if other questions are more 
pressing—counsel will have to react to the questions 
actually posed during the allotted time, just as before. 
Naturally, if this results in a surplus of quality questions, 
the court can always allow additional time to answer them. 
 
COURT: Well that’s the key right there. Extra time makes 
preliminary questions unnecessary. Or we can order 
supplemental briefs or post-argument submissions,
126
  or 
even order re-argument.
127
 No need to mess around with 
how we question. 
 
124. Any court could, if preferred, choose to dispense with anonymity. Judge Selya, for 
example, had the First Circuit issue pre-argument inquiries by his order. Docket Survey, 
supra note 62. 
125. Not entirely without reason. See Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusion of Devil’s 
Advocacy: How the Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions During 
Oral Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271 (2004). 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting 
that en banc court had directed parties to submit supplemental briefs on three specific 
questions following oral argument); St. Luke’s Hosp. Ass’n of Cleveland v. United States, 
1 Ohio Misc. 89, 163–64 (6th Cir. 1964) (acknowledging request by judge at oral argument 
that counsel submit post-argument letters responding to hypothetical fact patterns). 
127. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 87, 112, 113, supra. Or the initial argument 
may be postponed. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 512 U.S. 1280 (1994) (directing 
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COUNSEL: No one option does everything, so it’s better to 
add to the judicial toolkit. Additional argument time may 
not improve the quality of an impromptu answer; it doesn’t 
allow for research or reflection, let alone enable counsel to 
confer with colleagues or clients not sitting at counsel table 
(and courts of appeals, at least, do not have lots of extra 
time lying around). Supplemental briefing requires time 
and resources, and may be unworkable if questions surface 
only shortly before argument; post-argument submissions 
are certainly a great option, and should be encouraged, but 
they may also be too little too late.
128
 Re-argument is the 
most substantial undertaking, usually saved for the most 
significant type of reorientation, and ordering it can be 
divisive.
129
 It seems better to try hard to get argument right 
the first time. 
 
COURT: Supposing this helps counsel advocate more 
effectively, so what? If you haven’t noticed, we’re really 
arguing among ourselves. 
 
COUNSEL: Duly noted. Some judges have suggested that 
courts should focus on enhancing advocacy instead, since 
you can lobby each other off the clock.
130
  But—and this is 
to answer you more directly, your honor, even if the real 
argument is being conducted among the judges, preliminary 
questions can help. A judge interested in jump-starting 
consideration by her colleagues might propose a 
 
parties to address a question in supplemental briefs due on the day originally set for 
argument, which was postponed). 
128. That is not necessarily a deterrent. See, e.g., Mot. to File Supp. Br. after Arg. & 
Mot. to File Supp. Br. after Arg. for Pet’rs, McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 2005 WL 1361016 
(Apr. 22, 2005) (No. 03-1693) (filing second supplemental brief that addresses 
hypothetical posed at oral argument by Justice Kennedy). 
129. See Crist v. Cline, 434 U.S. 980 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting from order 
restoring case for oral argument, citing “violence to . . . assumptions underlying Article III 
of the Constitution”); see also text accompanying notes 112–13, supra (noting Justice 
Stevens’s criticism of reargument in Citizens United). 
130. Josh Gerstein, Clarence Thomas Defends Silence in Supreme Court Health Care 
Arguments, POLITICO—UNDER THE RADAR (Apr. 6, 2012, 11:29 a.m. EDT), http://www 
.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/04/clarence-thomas-defends-silence-in-supreme-
court-health-119823.html (quoting Justice Thomas: “‘We have a lifetime to go back in 
chambers and to argue with each other,’ he said. ‘They have 30, 40 minutes per side for 
cases that are important to them and to the country. They should argue. That’s a part of the 
process.’”). 
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preliminary question, before views become too fixed. (She 
could also hold back a hostile question, the better to 
surprise counsel, but then any judge more friendly to 
counsel’s position could offer it instead.) Basically, 
preliminary questions offer new options without killing off 
any old ones. 
 
COURT: We already do this when we want to, which is 
almost never. Deciding what to ask at oral argument is so 
much easier. I can withhold questions if things are going 
fine, or throw a monkey-wrench at counsel if they are 
making their positions sound better than they are. If I lob a 
question that isn’t great, at least it looks ad-libbed; if it is 
brilliant, I get all the credit. 
 
COUNSEL: Naturally, your honor, most questions will still 
await oral argument. But there’s value in rethinking this 
practice. Judges may not have internalized all the potential 
virtues or opportunities, or how things are done in other 
courts; most judges have likely never even tried to issue 
preliminary questions to see whether it works for them. 
Courts could also initiate broader experiments in their use, 
such as through their local rules and practices, and clerks of 
court could routinely ask judges their own preliminary 
question as to whether there are any preliminary questions 
for counsel. 
If I may, your honor, this is not just about choosing when to 
pose preliminary questions yourself, but also about how 
judges might react when they are not posed. Judges, 
perhaps, can be faulted when they fail to give adequate 
opportunity to answer. If you ask an unexpected and 
important question at argument, your colleagues might 
legitimately discount the answer. They might even say that 
you could have spent the time to hone the question and 
provide it in advance, if it seemed important to you at 
argument but a bit convoluted or confusing. 
 
COURT: [Unintelligible] 
 
COUNSEL: All I really mean, your honor, is that judges 
who try this more often may become convinced of its 
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value, as they get better answers that produce better 
decisions. 
 
COURT: Suppose you’re right, counsel. If this makes so 
much sense, how is it possible that courts don’t do it 
already? 
 
COUNSEL: I see that I am out of time. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Nothing can supplant counsel’s obligation to anticipate the 
countless directions the argument might take, and to distinguish 
themselves by preparing accordingly.
131
 Nor will anything—
even collegiality—prevent a judge from asking whatever comes 
to mind. Discussion at oral argument will inevitably, and 
appropriately, remain unscripted and unpredictable. Referring to 
his time as Solicitor General, Justice Jackson used to say that he 
always made three arguments in every case: 
First came the one that I planned—as I thought, logical, 
coherent, complete. Second was the one actually presented—
interrupted, incoherent, disjointed, disappointing. The third 
was the utterly devastating argument that I thought of after 
going to bed that night.
132
 
Regardless of preliminary questions, substantial differences 
between the argument as planned and the argument actually 
presented—not to mention the one perfected afterward—will 
 
131. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 51 (2008) (citing estimate by one leading advocate that 
for each argument, he prepares as many as 300 questions and develops answers to them); 
see also FREDERICK, supra note 11, at 202–83 (cataloging examples of mistakes and 
successes at oral argument). The risk of distinguishing oneself in a bad way is also a 
powerful deterrent. E.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: Disaster at the Lectern, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 8, 2011, 4:51 p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/argument-
recap-disaster-at-the-lectern/ (describing one counsel’s difficulties at oral argument); Tr. of 
Oral Arg., Waters v. Churchill,  1993 WL 757641 at 47–48 (Dec. 1, 1993) (No. 92-1450) 
(reporting Justice’s observation that fact-related argument had been made “for 25 minutes,” 
and querying whether counsel was “going to address the question of law that’s presented in 
the Petition for Certiorari at all,” followed later by comment that “we didn’t take this case 
to determine who said what in the cafeteria”). 
132. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective 
Case Presentations, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 803 (Nov. 1951). 
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persist. Counsel and courts benefit, though, if these gaps narrow. 
Counsel can plan a superior argument, and one better aligned 
with the perfect argument imagined afterward, if they anticipate 
a key question that might be raised during the actual 
presentation. Admittedly, what Jackson regarded as “utterly 
devastating arguments” will remain a rare commodity, even with 
the greatest notice. But isn’t it wiser to ask first? 
 
 
 
